**Gratius and Saraia, 2013**

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas” No. 374 /February 2013 <http://www.ceps.eu/book/continental-regionalism-brazil%E2%80%99s-prominent-role-americas> accessed tm 7-15)

# Brazil Sphere of Influence DA

### 1nc Shell – Sphere of Influence

#### Uniqueness - US absence in region provides Brazil opportunity to assert its regional power

**Gratius and Saraia, 2013**

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas” No. 374 /February 2013 <http://www.ceps.eu/book/continental-regionalism-brazil%E2%80%99s-prominent-role-americas> accessed tm 7-15)

¶ There was no agreement with the United States over how regional issues should be dealt¶ with, but the absence of a US policy for the region prevented any stand-off between the two¶ countries. The Brazilian government has operated autonomously whenever issues relating to¶ the continent have arisen. Washington’s low-profile in Latin America and the concentration¶ of a few countries of strategic interest (Colombia, Central America and Mexico) facilitated¶ Brazil’s proactive Latin American policy. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)¶ project was the last attempt to design a hemispheric project. Its failure at the Summit in Mar¶ del Plata in 2005 proved the limits of Washington’s traditional hegemony in the Americas¶ and contributed to a stronger regional profile of its rival in the South. Without a hemispheric¶ project, the Organization of American States (OAS) “lacks a guiding vision”23 and lost appeal¶ in Latin America. Although the OAS is still the most consolidated collective institution in the¶ Americas, it lacks both leadership and followers. Moreover, a serious financial crisis is¶ further weakening the traditional organisation. Brazil is promoting regional concertation¶ outside the traditional framework instead of increasing its weight in the inter-American¶ environment, which reflects a US hegemony. Against that background, Brazil perceives regional integration not only as a goal in itself but¶ also as an instrument for autonomy and ‘soft-balancing’ the United States.24 Thus, its attitude¶ towards integration is not free of self-interest. Apart from common regional goals, the¶ country also seeks to implement a neighbourhood policy that serves Brazil’s power¶ aspirations25 in South America and the Americas.

#### B. Economic ties with neighbors help Brazil achieve regional leadership

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

As this diplomacy indicates, Brazil is aiming for what one scholar calls “consensual hegemony.”62 Brazilian officials seek to portray their country’s diplomacy as a benign, unthreatening project so as to avoid reviving traditional fears of a hegemonic Brazil and thereby driving South American countries toward Caracas or Washington. (How successful they have been in doing so is open to dispute.) Accordingly, for Brazil to achieve effective regional leadership, it will have to forge consensual arrangements that provide its neighbors with economic and political benefits while drawing them deeper into the Brazilian orbit.

#### C – Democracy

#### 1. Brazil regional hegemony means expanded push for democratization

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

This brief analysis shows that Brazil is increasingly assertive in its region,¶ and willing to intervene if political crises threaten democracy. Brazil is most¶ likely to intervene during constitutional crises and political ruptures, and less so¶ when procedural issues during elections may affect the outcome**—**as was the¶ case during Hugo Chavez**’** re-election in 2012, when several commentators criticised¶ Brazil**’**s decision not to pressure the Venezuelan government to ensure fair elections.74 Yet, despite this distinction, it seems clear that the consolidation of¶ democracy in the region has turned into one of Brazil’s fundamental foreign¶ policy goals.

#### 2. Democratic decision-making is best for the environment, spreads risks proportionately and includes more voices into the equation

[Akash Goreeba](http://www.e-ir.info/author/akash-goreeba/) [writing for E-International Relations, an online resource and news outlet for global affairs] [Environmental Democracy? Does Anyone Really Care?](http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/26/environmental-democracy-does-anyone-really-care/) October 26, 2012

<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/26/environmental-democracy-does-anyone-really-care/>

It is not surprising that EU policy has placed emphasis on just sustainability a year after and EU governance white paper was produced (2001). In this White Paper, ‘’the modernization of European governance is seen as a necessary precondition for European integration through a process of decentralization, combating the impact of globalization, and a restoration of faith in democracy through wider involvement in decision making’’ (Agyeman & Evans 2004, p.162).¶ We have seen from the above the problematic of environmental justice. It is arguably particularly difficult when considered in the global context. It is not surprising that attempts to safeguard and provide environmental justice have now taken a small scale dimension. An example of a more small scale attempt at addressing the effects on environmental justice/injustice is the Environmental Justice Showcase Community by the EPA (environmental protection agency). Recently it was announced that the State of Jacksonville USA had been selected for the pilot scheme which would see a cash injection of over $100,000 by the EPA which would go towards addressing the environmental issues suffered by low income and minority communities.¶ ‘’EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced that, under the initiative, Jacksonville will be one of the national models for EPA’s commitment to EJ efforts. EJ refers to the disproportionate environmental burdens placed on low-income and minority communities’’ (EPA News Release, 04/2010). The project aims at working with the likes of schools, community organisations, local residents, as well as federal agencies. Greg Strong, Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Northeast District Director stated that ‘’we can achieve much more collectively, when we combine and leverage our resources, than as stand-alone organizations working independently… This kick-off event is an excellent way for us to find new opportunities to work collaboratively with our partners in order to benefit the local community and further improve human health and the environment’’(EPA News Release, 04/2010).¶ Those such as the EJF (Environmental Justice Foundation) have already done well to illustrate the usefulness of small scale local and community projects aimed at addressing environmental injustices, the EJF essentially operates via providing film and advocacy training and empowering ‘’local’’ communities. Some notable examples where this has been successful include the Cambodian Fisheries Action Coalition Team, or (FACT). The Team aimed to resolve conflicts over freshwater fisheries, in short the EJC ‘’ trained and equipped FACT with essential cameras, computer equipment, internet access and GPS systems. And thereby helped FACT gather essential information and testimonies and co-produced ‘Feast or Famine’, which was launched at a meeting hosted by the UK Ambassador to Cambodia and attended by World Bank, IMF and other representatives of the donor community, helping to put the issues firmly on the political agenda’’ (EJF 2010).¶ Other examples include the EJF’s ‘’educating on nature in Vietnam’’, ‘’CEDAC’’ aimed at reducing the use of deadly pesticides in Cambodia, and ‘’JALA’’ aimed at combating illegal fishing and helping poor fisherman in Sumatra. All the examples above have in common that they operated in the ‘’local’’ communities. Perhaps it is the case that both democracy and justice are best implemented at a local level.¶ We have looked at the importance as well as the problematic nature of environmental democracy and justice. As problematic as the two are, their importance are undeniable. There are numerous organisations and NGO’s that are dedicated to ensuring environmental democracy and justice, some of which have been discussed above. In a world where we are witnessing environmental degradation and problems globally, effective democracy and justice is a necessity.¶ Good environmental governance equates to good environmental democracy/justice. We have seen how minorities have suffered disproportionate environmental dis-benefits. In a supposed free world it is only fair that everyone should be allowed to experience both the risks and benefits associated with the environment, as well as future generations to come. And whilst from the above it is clear that environmental democracy/justice has a long way to go, it has done well so far to deal with many environmental issues globally, usually small scale and local. But it is undoubtedly the case that small scale localised efforts are most effective. It remains to be seen whether implementation of small scale localised agendas ‘’globally’’ will prove fruitful. And whilst the likes of Agyeman above, have argued that the majority of environmental issues ‘’fail to register a signal’, this is undeniably changing. Thanks to the efforts of the many who go out of their way to make consideration for the environment a key part of modern life.

## Uniqueness

### U – Brazil pursuing global power diffusion

#### Brazil fopo focused on global power diffusion – economic power key

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

In the second post-cold war phase, a new tendency of power diffusion has¶ developed, particularly after the turn of the century. This diffusion in power is¶ particularly strong in the economic dimension of the world system. The rise of¶ Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), particularly China, has been an important¶ aspect of this tendency as part of a more general trend towards the relative economic¶ strengthening of the East and the South and the relative economic decline¶ of the West and the North.2 This has accelerated as a consequence of the global¶ financial crisis that broke out in the USA in 2008.¶ Since 2003 the Brazilian government has been actively engaged in a foreign¶ policy strategy of global power diffusion. In this article I analyse Brazil’s foreign¶ policy priorities in the context of the transformations of the world system.¶ This topic is increasingly relevant, as Brazil has advanced economically in the¶ past decade to become the sixth largest economy in the world and has increasingly¶ achieved global recognition as a relevant emerging power. Brazil’s emergence¶ is somewhat surprising considering its recurrent problems with financial¶ instability in the 1980s and 1990s.

#### Brazil seeking regional hegemony – economy and environmental position

Brands, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and History at Duke Sanford, 2010, Hal, “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY”, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf), 7/9/13, JG

Moreover, while macroeconomic growth has been anemic in recent decades, factors like improved economic stability, growing purchasing power for the poor and middle class, and the development of both internal and external markets have allowed Brazil to crack the top 10 in rankings of the world’s largest economies (as measured in gross domestic product [GDP] at purchasing power parity).12 Prominent commentators, including Goldman Sachs, predict that the country may climb as high as fifth in this ranking in the next 40 years.13 A thriving biofuels program combined with aggressive offshore drilling has addressed Brazil’s internal fuel needs and increased its international economic influence amid concerns about the long-term cost and availability of petroleum supplies, and the exploitation of the offshore Tupi oil field will likely make Brazil a major player in the hydrocarbon market.14 These developments have not only increased Brazilian economic power and diplomatic standing; they have also raised national self-confidence after the trials of the 1980s and 1990s and allowed the foreign policy community to argue that progress at home justifies and requires expanded ambitions abroad. President Lula alluded to this dynamic when he declared that “Brazil is ready, Brazil is mature, Brazil is aware of the game which has to be played.”15

### U – Brazil hegemony high now – general

#### Brazil maintains regional dominance

**Gratius and Saraia, 2013**

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas” No. 374 /February 2013 <http://www.ceps.eu/book/continental-regionalism-brazil%E2%80%99s-prominent-role-americas> accessed tm 7-15)

In these times of change in the shaping of a new world order, Brazil has begun to stand out

for its assertive participation in international politics, where it has favoured anti-hegemonic,1

multi-polar positions and its increasingly strong leadership in its own region. During the

Lula administration from 2003 to 2010, Brazil gradually started step-by-step to shoulder the

costs inherent in cooperation, governance and integration in the region.2 At that time, the

Brazilian Development Bank BNDES – with a total budget that exceeds that of the Inter-

American Development Bank – began to finance infrastructure projects in South American.3

#### Brazil increase power – regional cooperation, peacekeeping prove

**Gratius and Saraia, 2013**

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas” No. 374 /February 2013 <http://www.ceps.eu/book/continental-regionalism-brazil%E2%80%99s-prominent-role-americas> accessed tm 7-15)

The election of Lula da Silva at the end of 2002 and the ensuing rise of an autonomy-oriented¶ group in Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cast the country’s foreign policy in a new light.4¶ Diplomatic support for existing international regimes in the 1990s gave way to a proactive¶ push towards modifying these regimes in favour of southern countries or Brazil’s particular¶ interests, which was defined by Lima as soft revisionism.5¶ The idea of bringing other emerging or poorer southern countries on board to¶ counterbalance the might of traditional Western powers served as the basis for the country’s¶ international actions. While coalitions with emerging partners helped boost Brazil’s global¶ pretensions,6 its diplomatic efforts were geared towards bolstering its international standing¶ independently of any other nation, with its role as a global player being firmly grounded in¶ the ideas of autonomy and universalism that were the predominant diplomatic thinking at¶ the time.¶ Alongside Brazil’s international rise, its leadership in South America also started to be seen¶ as a priority. Indeed, the moves to boost its global and regional projection came¶ simultaneously and were seen by Brazil as mutually beneficial. The cooperation with its¶ regional neighbours was perceived by policy-makers as the best way for Brazil to realise its¶ potential, support economic development and form a bloc with stronger international¶ influence. The creation of the South American Defence Council and the Brazilian command¶ of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti, whose troops are drawn from different countries in¶ the region, were seen as helping Brazil towards a permanent seat on the UN Security¶ Council. According to Flemes, in its upward progress in a new, more multi-polar world¶ order, Brazil would need regional clout in global negotiations, but would not be tied down to¶ any form of institutionalisation that might restrict its autonomy.7

#### Brazil economic growth and enhanced international standing increase regional hegemony

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup. Brazil will soon host both — within two years of each other.¶ Now that's ambition and recognition ¶ As far as economies go, the world's seventh largest has been one of the BRICS for a decade, but when it comes to its geopolitical role, Brazil wants to be seen as a rock.¶ "The symbolism is huge," says Shannon K. O'Neil, who follows Latin America at the Council on Foreign Relations. "All of a sudden the world will see Brazil beyond pictures of carnival. For Brazilians, it means they will finally be at the center of the world stage."¶ And what a long, strange trip it's been.¶ After a century of a coffee economy, the 20th century brought revolution, protectionism, an economic miracle amid a series of military juntas, a debt crisis, a decade of hyperinflation and the impeachment of a civil president.¶ "In the past, Brazil's reach has always exceeded its grasp," says Eric Farnsworth, VP of the Council of the Americas, and a former Clinton administration official. "It always saw itself as a leader, but has been frustrated that the world saw it another way. The Brazilian economy is developing to the point where it does have the global heft that people have to take it seriously." That development has already brought a quadrupling of GDP since 1993 to $2.09 trillion, right before the 1994 introduction of the now famous Real Plan, a group of measures meant to snuff out inflation and stabilize the economy.¶ "That was the turning point," says Carlos Pereira of the Brookings Institution and Michigan State University, who calls the Real Plan one of two catalysts for the the geopolitical ascent of Brazil.¶ The other — a 1988 constitutional change that delegated greater powers to the president —was exemplified in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aka Lula, who promoted and advanced Brazil's transformation into a global power until the end of his presidency in January.¶ "Brazil is definitely benefiting from the the right policies, and regaining international credibility and more recognition," says Pereira.

### U - Brazil hegemony high – economy

#### Brazil’s economy post Great Recession improved Brazil international position

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

More recently, Brazil — which survived the financial crisis better than most — played an important role in post-crisis G20 initiatives on banking regulation, currencies and other financial issues. It's also been more involved in World Bank and IMF initiatives and policies.¶ "This is a role the rest of the world would not have ceded to Brazil in the past," says Farnsworth.¶ "Whether it's in G20 and multi-lateral architecture or climate change, Brazil is now one of those in the room at the end," adds Shannon.

### U – Brazil exports high now

#### Exports high now – source of economic power

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

This suggests a lack of success in trade negotiations, but it can hardly be¶ blamed on Brazil. Indeed, although Brazil could have gained from an agreement¶ at the WTO, its exports have nonetheless expanded significantly since 2002, largely¶ thanks its boom in commodity exports to Asia and China. Brazil has also¶ had success in its exports to Latin America and other developing countries. This¶ has allowed it to stabilise and strengthen its economy to the point of becoming¶ the sixth largest economy in the world and a net contributor to the IMF.

### U – Brazil heg high - US decline

#### U – Brazil hegemony increasing as US and Europe decline

**Barbosa, former Brazil ambassador to US, 2011**

(Ruben, National Interest, july CIAO accessed TM 7/8)

From an historical perspective, relations¶ between Brazil and the United States over¶ the past 165 years were not as smooth as¶ many now assume they were. In broad terms,¶ the relationship could be reasonably characterized¶ as marked by considerable mutual suspicion¶ and distrust most of the time. It is important¶ to acknowledge and understand this checkered¶ past so that we do not fall prey to false optimism¶ about the future. Recent transformations in both¶ countries, and in the world at large, suggest that¶ the U.S.- Brazilian relationship over the next decade¶ will require careful tending.¶ The effects of globalization, the importance¶ of emerging countries like Brazil and the shift of¶ the world’s main political, economic and trade¶ axis from the Atlantic to the Pacific, especially¶ owing to the rise of China, have fundamentally¶ altered the foreign policy of many countries.¶ The global economic crisis that began in the¶ United States in 2008 accelerated these transformations,¶ and one of its consequences was a¶ relative decline in U.S. global influence. A new,¶ multipolar world now challenges more than ever¶ U.S. and European predominance. Although¶ the United States retains unmatched in military¶ and strategic power, it must now share with¶ emerging countries like China, Russia, India¶ and Brazil its traditional role of shaping global¶ political, economic and financial decisions.

#### Brazil on the rise in light of US failure in the region

**Shifter and Joyce 9** (Michael Shifter, a Current History contributing editor and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, is vice president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue, Daniel Joyce, is a program associate at the Dialogue, “No Longer Washington’s Backyard”, Inter-American Dialogue, February 2009, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Current%20History%20-%20No%20Longer%20Washington's%20Backyard%20(2-2009).pdf,accessed> 7/9/2013, GU)

By fits and starts, Brazil has moved to build its global profile by taking a reluctant leadership role in the region. Brazil was constructive in defusing tensions between Colombia and Ecuador following a cross-border incursion in 2008. It has also acted as an honest broker in Bolivia’s internal conflict and was a driving force in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Likewise, Brazil has taken the lead in UNASUR, an attempt to integrate various subregional trade groups, and in the “Group of 20,” which made developing countries a force to be reckoned with in working out global trade deals.

Of course, disagreements and tensions with neighbors are inevitable for a regional power.

Nationalist sentiments and policies in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, for example, have complicated Brazil’s investments in the region. Nevertheless, Brazil has moved to fill the vacuum left by a diminished US presence in South America and has helped steady its occasionally turbulent neighborhood.

#### Brazil foreign policy decisions – international implications

**Bodman and Wolfensohn, Chairs Independent Task Force CFR, 2011**

(Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director

“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Independent Task Force Report No. 66 CAIO accessed tm 7/9)

To be sure, Brazil is still contending with important internal concerns—¶ its remaining poor, the growing challenges of climate change,¶ and its ongoing transformation from a commodity-based to an industrial¶ economy, to name just a few. Nevertheless, the message of this¶ report could hardly be clearer: Brazil matters not just regionally but¶ globally. Its decisions and actions will affect the world’s economy, environment,¶ and energy future as well as prospects for diplomacy and¶ stability. Brazil is on the short list of countries that will most shape¶ the twenty-first century. U.S. and Brazilian foreign policy must adjust¶ accordingly.

#### Brazil position – economy

**Barbosa, former Brazil ambassador to US, 2011**

(Ruben, National Interest, july CIAO accessed TM 7/8)

¶ Accounting for 52 percent of South¶ America’s GDP, Brazil will undoubtedly play¶ an essential role in the integration and economic¶ development of the region, as well as¶ the improvement of its social conditions and¶ the strengthening of its institutions. Sustainable¶ growth will bring greater opportunities¶ for foreign partners. The United States has¶ already achieved burgeoning trade surpluses¶ with Brazil over the past two years. If recent¶ growth rates continue, Brazil’s GDP over the¶ next five years will surpass that of Italy, France¶ and Great Britain, making it the world’s fifthlargest¶ economy. This growth will broaden the¶ scope of Brazilian interests and heighten their¶ significance in the view of its foreign partners,¶ not least the United States.

#### **Brazil increasing its position in region – US SQ foreign policy recognizes**

Sotero, Director, The Brazil Institute—Wilson Center, November 2012

(Paulo, Pursuing a productive relationship between the US and Brazil, accessed on 7/6 at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/115057891/Pursuing-a-Productive-Relationship-Between-the-U-S-and-Brazil-A-Wilson-Center-Policy-Brief>, DL)

¶ Brazil’s emergence as a substantive international actor and the country’s rise as the world’s sixth-largest economy have introduced new factors in the Brazil-US relationship that policymakers in Washington and Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is now also home to dozens of Brazilian-controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded their operations worldwide, particularly in the United States. Some of those enterprises occupy substantial positions as investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation, and special steel industries. The growing presence of Brazilian companies in the United States offers a new perspective on matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty, which the two countries have talked about for four decades. What was once an issue of interest only for U.S. companies in Brazil is now on the agendas of Brazilian firms operating in U.S. markets. Participants in the 2012 annual meeting of the BrazilU.S. Business Council, held in October in Brasília, say the political pressure generated by the new reality of Brazilian global companies in the United States has created momentum for the Brazilian Congress to approve a bilateral agreement on the exchange of tax information. That agreement is seen as the first step for a treaty addressing double taxation. ¶ ¶ Brazil and the United States have also taken on global challenges together, benefiting from Brazil’s ability to wield soft power and newfound status in multilateral forums. The Open Government Initiative, which Brazil and the United States launched in 2011, has attracted more than 40 countries committed to promoting transparency, fighting corruption, and harnessing new technologies to make government more open, effective, and accountable.¶ ¶ As suggested by developments on taxation and by the progress made in the Open Government Initiative, gradualism is the crucial ingredient in efforts to advance U.S.-Brazil relations. It is in trade that this approach will likely have the greatest effect. Having rejected the Free Trade Area of the Americas for fear that Brazilian industry would be threatened by American competitors, Brazil now faces a similar threat from China. This threat has caused the industrial sector in Brazil to warm up to the idea of trade arrangements that preserve their regional markets in the face of Chinese competition. One of the challenges U.S. and Brazilian leaders face in the months and years ahead is finding ways to build support for such arrangements. ¶ ¶ In related efforts, the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which was signed by leaders of nine countries in November 2011, will promote and advance trade and investment ties between the Pacific nations of North and South America and Asia’s most dynamic economies. This agreement should be advanced in ways that invite Brazil’s participation and avoid the perception held by some Washington pundits that it could be used to isolate or create difficulties for Brazil. The problem with this concern is that Brazil is the Latin American nation that relevant Asia-Pacific countries are most interested in engaging with— because of its size, position as the world’s sixthlargest economy, abundance of resources needed by other major emerging nations, potential for growth, and tradition of pragmatism. Under President Obama’s administration, the United States has increasingly recognized Brazil’s growing weight and relevance. In a region where the United States was once the hegemon and where today Brazil faces new challenges to advancing its interest and values and asserting its leadership, pursuing a strategy of cooperation rather than competition is the wiser decision for both countries.

## Links

### Links – Cuba key to Brazil sphere of influence

#### Brazil- Cuba relations alternative to US embargo

**Gratius and Saraia, 2013**

(Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva “Continental Regionalism:

Brazil’s prominent role in the Americas” No. 374 /February 2013 <http://www.ceps.eu/book/continental-regionalism-brazil%E2%80%99s-prominent-role-americas> accessed tm 7-15)

A fourth step in Brazil’s strategy was to expand the country’s interests to Central America¶ and the Caribbean. Once its prominent role in South America and on the global stage had¶ been consolidated, Brazil’s political elites began to draw more attention to Central America¶ and the Caribbean, which had been traditionally under the influence of the United States. An¶ important strategic movement (and alternative to US sanctions policy) was the renewal of¶ relations with Cuba. Historical political affinities between the Workers’ Party and Castroism¶ motivated closer bilateral relations and economic cooperation.22 In 2004, Brazil assumed the¶ military command of the UN mission in Haiti. Although its engagement in Haiti had more to¶ do with its aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it helped¶ to foster Brazil’s relations with the Caribbean. In 2009, rather by accident (the former¶ president Manuel Zelaya chose the Brazilian Embassy in which to escape from his¶ adversaries), the former Lula government got involved in the political crisis in Honduras¶ after the military coup against the elected President Zelaya. This pro-active policy of the¶ Brazilian government illustrates a political will to think about neighbourhood policy beyond¶ South America. Latin America is the fourth (and less relevant) cycle of Brazil’s regional¶ policy. The prominence of the autonomy-oriented group or ‘developmentalist faction’ in the¶ Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the post-Washington consensus in the region¶ (meaning a major role of the state as a social and economic agent) paved the way for new¶ regional priorities. Not economic integration but political consultation and diplomacy are¶ today’s cornerstones of Latin American integration.

#### Brazil increasing regional position using Cuba collaboration

**Gomez,** assistant professor in the department of public policy and administration at Rutgers University, **2013**

(Eduardo J, “Brazil Cuban Connection”, Quarterly Americas, January 18, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazils-cuban-connection#.UP6HuTT3-Qg.twitter%20%E2%80%A6>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

Brazil is once again seeking to enhance its international profile. But this time, rather than engaging in close partnerships with its fellow BRICS club members—Russia, India, China, and South Africa—Brazil is collaborating with a smaller nation: Cuba.¶ Since assuming office in 2011, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has worked closely with Cuban President Raúl Castro to strengthen their partnership in the hopes of further bolstering Brazil's economic advantages and regional influence. She is achieving this by providing financial and technical assistance to help restructure Cuba's economy while at the same time advancing Brazil’s economic interests through strategic investments in port infrastructure. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez' quickly deteriorating health has created incentives for Dilma to fortify her ties with Castro, gradually replacing Venezuela—Cuba’s biggest benefactor—as Cuba's most important ally in the region. But instead of bullying Cuba into following Brazil's lead, Dilma is also gaining something in return for her citizens: technical assistance from Cuba to address educational illiteracy, a long-time developmental challenge for Brazil. In so doing, Cuba benefits by displaying its impressive success in education reform, while highlighting its potential to be an amicable partner in hemispheric affairs.Dilma has continued the policy toward Cuba set by her predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. She has increased assistance, offering to help build a new port in the Mariel section of Cuba, located just a few miles outside of Havana. Brazilian engineers have been working with their Cuban counterparts to build a port facilitating Cuba's trade. The port will facilitate Cuban trade and is being seen as a gateway for a free-trade zone in the Americas.Beyond trade, the current port, as well as most of Havana's industry, is located in the tourist area of Old Havana. However, this has contributed to a foul stench in the air—a turn-off for most tourists.

### Link – exports

#### Brazil relies on exports diversification to build relations in region and challenge dominant powers

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

The change in government in Brazil in 2003 represents a turning point in the¶ country’s foreign policy. The new government pursued an activist foreign policy¶ agenda that focused on South–South coordination in a strategy that Vigevani¶ and Cepaluni have called ‘autonomy through diversification’.12 According to¶ this approach, the way forward for Brazil was to pursue alliances with large¶ peripheral countries, to avoid subordination to the agendas of dominant¶ countries, and to pursue active domestic development policies and reduce¶ domestic inequalities.13 This policy orientation corresponded to the autonomist¶ current within the Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,14 and to¶ the traditional foreign policy orientation of the Workers’ Party. According to¶ Almeida Brazil’s foreign policy, while maintaining the typical professionalism¶ of the diplomats at Itamaraty, came to be dominated by the Workers’ Party line,¶ thereby diverging from the traditional autonomy of the Itamaraty in the definition¶ of the foreign policy direction.15 The policy of diversification also relied on¶ support from the leading industrial business organisations, the Confederação¶ Nacional da Indústria (CNI) and Fiesp, which shared the government’s view that¶ Brazil needed to increase its exports substantially in order to stabilise the economy¶ and create conditions for renewed economic growth.16 The foreign policy¶ priorities can be summed up as a focus on diversification of trade and on¶ South–South relations generally but especially in terms of South American relations¶ and relations with other large peripheral countries.

### Link – energy exports

#### Energy exports solidify Brazil position in region

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Moreover, while macroeconomic growth has been anemic in recent decades, factors like improved eco­nomic stability, growing purchasing power for the poor and middle class, and the development of both internal and external markets have allowed Brazil to crack the top 10 in rankings of the world’s largest economies (as measured in gross domestic product [GDP] at purchasing power parity).12 Prominent com­mentators, including Goldman Sachs, predict that the country may climb as high as fifth in this ranking in the next 40 years.13 A thriving biofuels program com­bined with aggressive offshore drilling has addressed Brazil’s internal fuel needs and increased its interna­tional economic influence amid concerns about the long-term cost and availability of petroleum supplies, and the exploitation of the offshore Tupi oil field will likely make Brazil a major player in the hydrocarbon market.14 These developments have not only increased Brazilian economic power and diplomatic standing; they have also raised national self-confidence after the trials of the 1980s and 1990s and allowed the foreign policy community to argue that progress at home jus­tifies and requires expanded ambitions abroad. Presi­dent Lula alluded to this dynamic when he declared that “Brazil is ready, Brazil is mature, Brazil is aware of the game which has to be played.”15 Understanding how President Lula has played this game requires a closer examination of his worldview.

### Link – regional economic engagement

#### Regional engagement with South America key to Brazil hegemonic rise

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

There are different views on how to analyse Brazil**’**s foreign policy orientation.¶ Pecequilo argues that Brazil**’**s relations are relatively balanced between¶ South**–**South relations and Brazil**’**s relations with the developed world,3 whereas¶ Almeida argues that Brazil**’**s foreign policy priorities after 2003 took a Third¶ Worldist orientation similar to Brazil**’**s independent foreign policy tradition¶ before the introduction of an authoritarian government in 1964.4 Following¶ Almeida**’**s view, I argue that Brazil since 2003 has prioritised South**–**South relations,¶ particularly relations with South America and the other BRICS countries¶ (Russia, India, China and now also South Africa). Brazil has also been interested¶ in other regions like Africa and the Middle East, but South America and¶ BRICS have been the top priorities thanks to their particular relevance to Brazil**’**s¶ economy and its ambition to rise in the global political hierarchy.

### Link and internal link – ethanol

#### Brazil using ethanol exports to check China influence and establish their position in region

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

In recent years, Brazil has stepped up in a number of diverse areas, say analysts, from leading the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti following President Aristede's exit — a very tough assignment — to providing generous financial aid around the world, especially in Africa, something of a counterbalance to China's efforts, to shaping the debate on climate change.¶ "You've seen under Lula the vindication of democratic capitalism."¶ That aid — also in the Middle East and Caribbean — has been matched by commercial endeavors, notably ethanol production, an area where Brazil has been a market leader.¶ "In some ways they're competing with China for influence and economic opportunity," says O'Neil.

### Link – US unilateralism in region

#### Brazil views Latin America as sphere of interest – economic policies and opposition to US unilateralism help shape power

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

The government was extremely ambitious on the foreign policy front. Brazil¶ aimed to build up power resources through economic strengthening and¶ alliances with other developing countries as a way to gain more influence on¶ the international political scene. Furthermore, the government sought to turn¶ South America into Brazil**’**s sphere of interest,17 and to use the continent as a¶ platform for its competitive insertion in the global economy and its political¶ ambitions in the regional and global arenas. Brazil**’**s ambitions did not end¶ here, however. The new government also sought to transform the global order¶ by working against US unilateralism, as epitomised by the Iraq war of 2003,18¶ and to raise Brazil**’**s position in the global hierarchy of states. Thereby, Brazil¶ would contribute to a more multipolar world in which the country could¶ become the leader of a united South America.19 Furthermore, Brazil sought to¶ assure its presence in all the relevant multilateral arenas of global economic¶ and political governance, with the major aim of its inclusion as a permanent¶ member of the UN Security Council.20 Foreign ministers have time and again¶ argued that a key foreign policy objective was to promote a fairer and more¶ economically balanced world as well as a more democratic international system¶ that would be more inclusive of developing countries.21 President Lula linked¶ uneven development to the global human rights situation, arguing for the need¶ to assure a more socially and economically balanced world order. In a speech¶ given at the UN in 2003 he specifically criticised the dominant powers for not¶ paying enough attention to the need to fight global poverty and hunger.22 In¶ this way Lula internationalised his government**’**s domestic social agenda, which¶ emphasised the combating of hunger and poverty and the facilitation of¶ development.23

#### US Unilateral action of the plan undercuts the regional position of Brazil – direct tradeoff with position

**Rothkopf, 2009**

(David, “The Perils of Rivarly”, Center for American Progress, March, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

One such subtext is that Brazil does not want to be lumped in with other large Latin countries, considering itself to be at a different level than either Mexico or Argentina, to pick the two most prominent examples. Another such subtext is that Brazil will be ever more sensitive to the old U.S. technique of working around them to undercut their regional leadership and establish separate relationships in the hemisphere that might, in fact, isolate or contain Brazilian influence. Another, of course, is that Brazil will not only have its own agenda that will be different from that of the United States, but it will also want to assert the differences.

#### US position in region key tradeoff with Brazil position – obstacle to Brazil rise

**Einaudi 11** (Luigi R. Einaudi, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, he is a Member of the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement”, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, March 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf>, accessed 7/6/2013, GU)

A new generation of Brazilian leaders has emerged who tend to see U.S., and generally Western, political and economic influence as a generic obstacle to Brazil’s rise, and therefore as something to be checked when possible.31 Sentiments of this kind fed UNASUR and the “inter-regional mechanisms” of the South-South Dialogue, India–Brazil–South Africa, and the BRIC. Unobjectionable and even positive in themselves, these initiatives often seemed accompanied by an undercurrent of anti-Americanism.¶ President Lula’s attempt to break the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program had its roots partly in past tensions with the United States over Brazil’s own nuclear programs.32 But it also derived from the conviction that the United States is often part of the problem and that Brazil can help achieve solutions that others, including the United States, have let slip away.¶ The negative reactions of the United States and other major powers to the initiatives taken with Iran by Brazil and Turkey show that global involvement for Brazil is not without costs. Brazilian policy was criticized at home and abroad for overreaching, hubris, and inadequate preparation. U.S. views of Brazil as an unreliable partner unwilling to make the difficult choices necessary to sustain world order suddenly mirrored Brazilian views of the United States as dedicated to military adventurism by flaunting the UN Security Council on Iraq.

#### US Brazil regional hegemony – zero sum (assumes US in lead now)

**Kozloff**, author of Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left, **2012**

(Nikolas, “Is Obama wary of Brazil and Dilma Rousseff”, May 5, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/2012428134850333757.html>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

In an unsettling development for Washington, Brazil has muscled in on the traditional sphere of influence of the US. In 2006, former Brazilian president **Lula traveled to Lima** to meet with his Peruvian counterpart, Alan García. The Brazilian leader stressed the need for greater physical integration between Peru and Brazil, and lobbied for a regional, military and political alliance between the two countries.

Lest García get the wrong idea about Brazilian intentions, Lula declared that his country did not seek regional "hegemony" but merely sought to transform South America into "a global actor on a par with China and India".  Responding to Lula, García candidly admitted that he preferred Brazilian regional hegemony to that of the United States.There are clear indications that Washington is made uneasy by Brazil's sudden rise. One year prior to Lula's Peruvian trip, Curtis Struble, the US ambassador to Lima, **wrote**that the US was enmeshed in an "undeclared contest" with Brazil for political influence in the Andean region. "We are winning on most issues that count," Struble added, remarking that negotiations over a US-Peru free trade deal had remained positive. However, the ambassador noted ominously, "the government of Brazil is still very much in the game" and had met with some success in pushing for the so-called South American Community of Nations or UNASUR, which would diminish US influence.If anything, the contest for regional dominance has only intensified in recent years. Peru's current leader, Ollanta Humala, hired campaign advisers tied to Lula's Workers' Party during his country's most recent presidential campaign. Moreoever, as soon as he was elected president, Humala flew to Brazil and met with Lula protégé Dilma Rousseff. It was Humala's first official trip abroad in his new office and sent a clear sign of Peru's geopolitical priorities.

### Link helper – competition with US

#### US expansion into areas important to Brazil creates a barrier to Brazil’s rise and realization of fopo goals

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

Brazil can thus be seen as a power which to a significant extent sees itself in¶ opposition to the USA and the West, which are largely treated as barriers to the¶ realisation of its foreign policy aims, whereas relations with developing countries¶ are seen conversely as relations that could potentially facilitate Brazil**’**s rise¶ and the realisation of its aims. This does not mean, however, that Brazil does¶ not collaborate with the Western world; for it clearly does.¶ In the following section, I analyse Brazil**’**s regional and hemispheric foreign¶ policy strategies and its global strategies. I emphasise the role of Brazil**’**s cooperation¶ with South America and BRICS, as well as its strong focus on promoting¶ multilateralism and gaining influence in multilateral institutions.

#### Competition with US empirically erodes Brazil power – tradeoff with influence when US attempts to increase influence

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

From the outset of his government Lula declared that the greatest foreign policy¶ priority for Brazil would be to build a democratic, prosperous, socially just and¶ united South America. To achieve this, it was emphasised that it would be¶ essential to revitalise Mercosur,24 which had entered a crisis as a consequence¶ of the severe economic difficulties experienced particularly by Argentina and¶ Uruguay at the time. This emphasis built upon the view that a strong and united¶ South America could work as a platform for Brazil**’**s competitive insertion in¶ the global economy and as a platform for its ambitions to become a significant¶ global player. In the strategic vision of Secretary General of Foreign Affairs¶ Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Brazil should pursue a conscious national project¶ in which South America would become a non-hegemonic pole in a multipolar¶ global system based on a close alliance between Argentina and Brazil.¶ Guimarães further argued that South America and Brazil, in particular, were¶ faced with a decision to either create a united South America that would serve¶ its peoples or to face political subordination to US hegemony and the social chaos and economic backwardness that would ensue.25 Brazil**’**s aim was clearly¶ to establish itself as a leader in a South American bloc, a strategy that faced difficult¶ challenges, particularly thanks to competition for influence with the¶ USA.

### Link- plan challenges grand strategy

#### Brazil’s grand strategy challenge the US dominance – regionally and through ties with countries not friendly with US

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

This monograph makes two principal arguments, one pertaining to the nature of Brazilian grand strate­gy, the second regarding its ramifications and chances for success. Under President Lula, Brazil has followed a multi-layered grand strategy that emphasizes a gradual and peaceful—yet nonetheless significant—revision of the international order. While Brazilian of­ficials recognize the benefits that their nation has de­rived from the *Pax Americana,* they still view the current order—characterized by U.S. military and strategic hegemony and the economic hegemony of the West—as prejudicial to the development, commercial inter­ests, and diplomatic influence of emerging countries like Brazil. The fundamental goal of Brazilian grand strategy has thus been to hasten the transition from the dominance of the developed world to a multipolar order in which international power balances and insti­tutions are more favorable to the assertion of Brazil’s interests. Because Brazil still faces, and will continue to face, a relative deficit of economic and military might, President Lula has resorted to a strategy com­monly used by “middle powers,” countries that rely on multilateralism, coalition-building, and other such methods to achieve systemic influence. At the global level, he has sought to strengthen international norms and organizations that can check American power, a classic soft-balancing technique. He has also forged overlapping webs of bilateral partnerships and mul­tilateral coalitions designed to diversify Brazil’s com­merce, improve its strategic flexibility, and augment its leverage in international negotiations. This has en­tailed embracing players from the entire spectrum of international actors, including countries—Iran being one notable example—that are deeply hostile to the United States. At the regional level, President Lula has committed himself to establishing Brazil as the recog­nized leader of a more united South America, with the aim of expanding his country’s power base and hitch­ing its global ambitions to the aggregate geopolitical weight of its continent.

### Link – democracy advantages

#### Democratization promotes Brazil regional economic and security interests

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

While Brazil usually acts swiftly in face of political instability, it is far more¶ reluctant to intervene in places where democracy suffers from procedural problems—¶ such as in Venezuela, where President Chavez used the state apparatus to¶ promote his campaign, leading to an uneven playing field between him and his¶ opponent, Henrique Capriles. One way to explain Brazil’s reluctance to intervene¶ in such cases is that they do not affect Brazil’s economic interests in the¶ region. Democracy promotion can thus be seen not necessarily as an end in¶ itself, but rather as an important element of Brazil’s strategy to strengthen its¶ growing economic presence in the region. Similarly to the USA, democracy¶ promotion thus largely aligns with Brazil’s national interests as an emerging¶ power.

#### Democratization in region protects Brazil regional interests

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

As the analysis makes clear, a realist approach is best at accounting for rising¶ democracies’ behaviour. Brazil and India promote democracy as long as doing¶ so is aligned with their overall strategic and economic interests, and if they are¶ willing to adopt democracy promotion as means to legitimise their growing¶ influence. In this respect their approach is similar to the Western practice. While¶ promoting democracy may endanger India’s foreign policy goal of maintaining¶ regional stability, it is increasingly aligned with Brazil’s national interests as a¶ regional hegemon. Given that autocratic leaders are more likely to endanger¶ Brazilian investments in the region, for example by expropriating Brazilian¶ investments, democracy promotion has become a key tool with which to contain¶ threats against the legitimacy of the established order and to defend Brazil’s¶ growing economic presence in South America.

### Links – Venezuela key to Brazil sphere of influence

#### Venezuela provides new market for expanding Brazil markets

**Israel, 2013**

(Esteban, “Brazilian firms root for Chavez’s man in Venezuela vote”, Reuters, March 21, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/21/us-venezuela-brazil-business-idUSBRE92K0ZY20130321>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

If Brazil's business leaders could vote in Venezuela's election next month, they would cast their ballots for Hugo Chavez's political heir, acting president Nicolas Maduro. They never supported the anti-capitalist bluster of Chavez, who died of cancer last month, but they hope to hold on to lucrative contracts for food exports and construction projects that he signed with Brazil's former leftist leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his successor, Dilma Rousseff. "In the near term, a Maduro win would be best," said Jose Augusto de Castro, head of Brazil's Foreign Trade Association.Brazil, the world's seventh largest economy, has emerged as regional powerbroker in Latin America with moderate center-left policies that it hopes can influence more stridently left-wing neighbors such as Venezuela.With Brazil's economy slowing to a crawl, the last thing its entrepreneurs want to do is forfeit growing markets.Over the past decade, Brazil's exports to Venezuela soared by 533 percent to some $5 billion, making it Brazil's second largest market in Latin America after Argentina, both major buyers of Brazilian manufactured goods. Economists say Brazil's investments in Venezuela are around $20 billion.Venezuela, an oil producing nation that imports some 70 percent of its food, is now the third largest consumer of Brazilian beef and an important buyer of its chicken. Key infrastructure projects launched during the 14 years of Chavez's government, from the Caracas metro expansion to bridges across the Orinoco river that divides Venezuela, are run by Brazilian firms like Odebrecht.

### Links – use of multilateral institutions

#### Unique link - Brazil use regional multilateralism to check US power – previous criticisms prove

**Wigell 11** (Mikael Wigell, researcher for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Assertive Brazil: An Emerging Power and Its Implications”, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 5/19/2011, <http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/190/>, accessed 7/10/2013, GU)

Brazil’s more assertive foreign policy has caused friction in its relations with the United States. Indeed, under Lula, Brazil assumed a series of postures perceived as “unhelpful” by the Bush and Obama administrations. Brazil voiced strong criticism of the US’s unilateral interventions, such as that in Iraq. It also criticized plans to expand the US military presence in Colombia as well as in Haiti for the purpose of disaster recovery, and refused to support the US position over the Honduras affair following the ousting of President Zelaya in June 2009.¶ Lula’s embrace of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the nuclear deal he helped broker with Iran enraged the Obama administration as well as the EU, who argued that it enabled Iran to employ a delaying tactic to avoid UN sanctions, while continuing to develop a nuclear weapon. Other postures such as the courting of Cuba’s Castro brothers, warning the States of strong Brazilian reactions if the US tried to destabilize Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and organizing the initiative for Latin American countries to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state according to its 1967 borders also formed part of Lula’s more independent foreign policy, through which he sought to boost multilateralism and carve out a more autonomous and proactive role for Brazil in international politics.¶ Crucially, Brazil’s efforts to promote regional integration have deliberately excluded the United States. Lula rejected the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) sought by the US. Instead, initiatives such as UNASUR and the expansion of Mercosur to include countries like Venezuela were designed to cut loose from restrictive trade agreements and undercut US hegemony in the region. Brazil has also voiced strong criticism of America’s handling of the financial crisis, accusing it of triggering a “currency war” through its policy of quantitative easing, while disputes over trade issues such as the US tariff on ethanol and its farm subsidies remain unresolved.¶ Brazil’s assertiveness does not, however, mean it is adopting the abrasive style of Venezuela’s Chávez. To be sure, within the Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign office, “autonomists” have become the dominant group of policymakers.4 They have reservations about US hegemony in the region and want to boost the autonomy of Brazilian actions. But they are ultimately pragmatists who, via engagement and negotiation, rather than by direct confrontation, want to create a favourable context for Brazil’s rise. Regional and international multilateralism is seen as the main instrument for curbing US hegemony and improving Brazil’s relative position in the global power structure.

## Impacts

### Brazil Hegemony Good: Iran – US war Module

#### 1. Brazil position key to mediating US Iran tensions and addressing Iranian prolif

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

A more controversial bilateral initiative is Presi­dent Lula’s vocal support for the Islamic regime in Iran. President Lula welcomed Iranian President Mah­moud Ahmadinejad to Brazil only a few months after the allegedly fraudulent June 2009 elections in Iran, and he has pointedly refused to condemn Iran’s nucle­ar program or support a move toward UN sanctions. In May 2010, President Lula joined with Turkish dip­lomats in brokering a nuclear agreement that would allow Tehran to ship only a portion of its uranium abroad for enrichment, a move widely seen as an ef­fort to help Iran avoid the imposition of a new round of sanctions by the Security Council. While this stance has occasioned criticism from Brazilian conservatives and U.S. observers, President Lula appears to see good relations with Tehran as a way of asserting Brazil’s au­tonomy vis-à-vis Washington, making itself a player in Middle Eastern politics, and potentially positioning itself as a mediator between Iran and the West—all of which fit nicely with Brazil’s broader middle power strategy. As Minister Amorim puts it, Iran is “the new geographic partner in our country’s policy.”50

#### 2. Impact - Iran Prolif makes wide-spread escalated nuclear war very likely

**Griffiths 2012**

(Rudyard, November 26, The Globe and Mail, “The Iran dilemma,” accessed Lexis, 3/2/13, gvk)

And yet, a nuclear Iran is intolerable due to four very serious considerations. It is unclear whether Iran will be a rational player. We may well be dealing with a culture that sanctifies death and glorifies 'martyrs' and suicide bombers, and has a wholly different attitude toward life than we do. Of course, there will not be symmetry between big Iran and little Is-rael: a single atomic bomb will not kill six million people here, but if it explodes in the centre of the country and takes 20,000 lives, life here will become very problematic, if it can go on at all. There is also a danger of unplanned and uncontrolled escalation: there is no hotline between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and no other stabilizing mechanisms between us and the Iranians, so the danger of an unplanned nuclear confrontation is significant. And, finally, nuclear proliferation is a near certainty: If Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states go nuclear, a mul-tipolar nuclear system will come into being in the Middle East - and by definition this will be unstable and very danger-ous. Such a situation - in which there will also be substate players - will create a big temptation to make use of nuclear weapons and could lead to the occurrence of a nuclear event. We must not get carried away with panic or sow anxiety, but Iran must be prevented from going nuclear.

### Extensions – wars in middle east escalate

#### Conflict in the Middle East causes Escalation

Politico, 10/6/12(Panetta: Syria clash with Turkey may escalate,http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82107.html CMO 12/29/12)

WASHINGTON — The continued exchange of artillery fire between Syria and Turkey raises additional concerns that the conflict may escalate and spread to neighboring countries, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Saturday. Panetta said the U.S. is using its diplomatic channels to relay worries about the fighting in the hopes that it will not broaden. His comments came on the heels of warnings from Turkey's prime minister that his country is not far from war with Syria. Turkish and Syria traded artillery fire Saturday as rebels clashed with President Bashar Assad's forces near the border, heightening the fears that the crisis could erupt into a regional conflict. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Friday cautioned Damascus not to test Turkey's "limits and determination" and said Ankara was not bluffing in saying it won't tolerate such acts. In other comments during a press conference with Peru's Defense Minister, Pedro Cateriano, Panetta warned that the international community is ready to impose more sanctions against Iran if the country does not begin to address concerns about its nuclear program. The economic sanctions are having a damaging effect on Iran, as inflation and unemployment rise, and the value of the currency drops, increasing prices. Iran, said Panetta, has to engage seriously with the international community to resolve issues with its nuclear program and if it doesn't, "make no mistake, the international community will continue to impose additional sanctions." Panetta's comments came after meetings Saturday with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, and the country's defense ministry — dubbed the Pentagonito — to continue meetings with Cateriano. After his meeting with Humala, Panetta said the U.S. is increasing efforts to build partnerships in the region and said America will do whatever it can to provide assistance to Peru to meet the challenges of terrorism, illicit trafficking and humanitarian needs. Later, he and Cateriano, during a joint press conference, said that they are negotiating an update in the defense cooperation agreement between their two countries. Noting that the last agreement was sealed in 1952, Panetta said the U.S. is committed to improving its ability to conduct joint military exercises, training and education exchanges with Peru. Cateriano said updating the agreement will help his country modernize its military. Panetta also said that the U.S. wants to work with Peru to confront the drug trafficking, calling it "one of the most serious threats we face in the hemisphere." He said he listened to the concerns of the Peru officials, and will determine if there is any additional help the U.S. can provide. Panetta is leaving Peru and will fly to Uruguay Saturday afternoon to attend a regional meeting of defense ministers from the Americas.

#### Iran War will destroy Israel, US Bases, and Damage Exports

Politico, 9/16/12(Iran warns Israel, U.S., <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81263.html#ixzz2GMONsUIr>, 12/29/12 CMO)

The top commander in Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard warned Sunday that his country’s missiles will ensure “nothing will remain” of Israel if it takes military action against Tehran over its nuclear program. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari also warned that Iran might close the Straits of Hormuz if it is attacked, withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and hit U.S. bases in the Middle East.Such warnings and references to Israel’s destruction have been made before by Iranian officials. But Gen. Jafari’s comments to a Tehran news conference were an unusually detailed, strongly worded and comprehensive listing of the means that Iran says it has to retaliate against a strike on its nuclear facilities. The United States and Israel have left open the possibility of such a strike if Iran does not back down from what they say are a push to develop nuclear weapons. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. “Our response to Israel is clear: I think nothing will remain of Israel (should it attack Iran). Given Israel’s small land area and its vulnerability to a massive volume of Iran’s missiles, I don’t think any spot in Israel will remain safe,” he said. He said Iran’s response to any attack will begin near the Israeli border. The Islamic Republic has close ties with militants in Gaza and Lebanon, both of whom have rocket arsenals that could be used for cross-border strikes. He said he did not believe however that Israel would attack on its own. Should the U.S. launch a strike, Jafari suggested that Iran could respond with missile salvos at U.S. bases in the Gulf. “The US military bases sprawled around Iran are considered a big vulnerability. Even the missile shields that they have set up, based on information we have, could only work for a few missiles but when exposed to a massive volume of missiles, the shields will lose their efficiency and will not work,” he said. He also said that Iran warned that oil shipments through the strategic Strait of Hormuz will be in jeopardy if a war breaks out between Iran and the United States. Iranian officials have previously threatened to close the waterway, the route for a fifth of the world’s oil, but less frequently in recent months. “If a war breaks out where one side is Iran and the other side is the West and U.S., it’s natural that a problem should occur in the Strait of Hormuz. Export of energy will be harmed. It’s natural that this will happen,” he said. Gen. Jafari said that, if attacked, Iran will no longer be committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under whose terms U.N. inspectors visit Iranian nuclear sites. He said however that this does not mean that Iran would build a nuclear weapon. “If the world and international organizations fail to prevent such an attack, it’s natural that Iran’s commitments (to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) would naturally change and the situation would be different from the past. These are the risks and consequences that such an attack will bring about, and these matters would be a deterrent.” Jafari’s comments come as U.S.-led naval forces from the West and Arab allies gather for naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf that include mine-sweeping exercises.

US- Iran war will escalate to nuclear world war - China and Russia will intervene

Jan 2006

(Abid Ullah “Why American will Reap in Iran What It Doesn’t Expect”, Posted February 20, http://mathaba.net/0\_index.shtml?x=528456)

Many analysts believe that an attack on Iran will turn into a World War because the Iranian government has a long-range strategy for "asymmetrical" warfare that will disrupt the flow of oil and challenge American interests around the world. Certainly, if one is facing an implacable enemy that is committed to "regime change" there is no reason to hold back on doing what is necessary to defeat that adversary. However, the main reason for escalation of the conflict will be exactly the assumption on the part of the United States, Israel and Britain that Iran cannot respond with nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear material—including red mercury and different forms of Uranium—were flowing in the streets of Pakistan, a high ranking Pakistani official, working in the Iranian consulate, told this writer that Iran is obtaining smuggled nuclear material from its field commanders in Afghanistan. It was well before the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan took place. Keeping this fact in mind, it is simply naïve to assume that the United States or Israel will launch an un-provoked war of aggression on Iran, and Iran will remain a sitting duck and not retaliate with what it must have refined and retooled since mid-nineties.[3] Even if we assume that the Iranian government purchased nuclear material without any intention of putting it to use, it is highly unlikely that it will still let this material gather dust while it is being openly and seriously threatened by the United States and Israel. If scientists in Germany and the United States could work to develop nuclear weapons from scratch during the World War II, how long will it take a nation pushed against the wall and with all the ingredients available to put something workable together and retaliate with a bang? So, the practical chances of Iran’s retaliation with a nuclear weapon in the face of a war of aggression imposed on it are far more than the theoretical assumptions that Iranian Intelligence will plan covert operations which will be carried out in the event of an unprovoked attack on their facilities. It is true that a nuclear response from Iran would mean a definite suicide when looked in perspective of the nuclear power of the United States and Iran. But it also doesn’t make any sense that the United States would keep bombing Iran, the way it has planned, into the Stone Age, yet despite being able to respond, Iran will simply turn the other cheek. This chain of inevitable reactions will in fact lead a wider conflagration that the warlords in Washington and Tel Aviv have not even imagined. Emboldened by their adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deluded by the IAEA conclusion that Iraq has no nuclear weapons, the warlords are set to go into a war that will definitely lead to massive bloodshed in the Middle East and the downfall of the United States as we see it. Despite Bush and company’s claims that the world is not the same after 9/11, the world remained more or less the same after 9/11. However, their world will surely turn upside down with their miscalculation of going into a third war of aggression in five years. The Russian and Chinese stakes in this issue cannot be ignored altogether. Attacking Iran would prove too much for Russia and China. Russia has snubbed Washington by announcing it would go ahead and honor a $700 million contract to arm Iran with surface-to-air missiles, slated to guard Iran's nuclear facilities. And after being burned when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority invalidated Hussein-era oil deals, China has snapped up strategic energy contracts across the world, including in Latin America, Canada and Iran. It can be assumed that both China and Russia will not sit idly by and watch Iran being annihilated by the United States. If Iran is attacked with lethal force, it will retaliate with the utmost force available at its disposal; that much is certain. Remembering my discussion 9 year ago with a well informed source who was working for the Iranian government, I am pretty sure that the utmost force in the hands of Iran definitely includes nuclear weapons. One of the signs for that is the confidence with which the Iranian government responds to US threats. Iranian leaders have acted responsibly and reasonably so far. It is always the mistake of extremists to misjudge the behavior of reasonable men. The Iranians tried to avoid purchasing nuclear material from the Pakistani black market to avoid arousing unnecessary suspicion. They kept their nuclear program limited to energy production. It is the United States and its allies which are provoking it into reaction. As a result, it has been a mistake of reasonable men in Iran to mistake the behavior of extremists in Washington and not getting out of NPT or testing a few nuclear devices to balance its power against its enemies. Many analysts are predicting that attack on Iran will be provoked because a majority of Americans are not in favor of a new war. Although setting up a pre-text for domestic support cannot be ruled out, one can say with certainty from the track record of Bush and company that they will hardly bother to engineer another terrorist attack.[4] In the fits of madness, they have already made themselves believe that they have enough justification to wage a war or aggression on Iran. The Washington Times has already started beating war drums and promoting "policy experts" who believe the US must go alone if needed (Feb 6, 2006).[5] Irrespective of any pretext and going alone or in a coalition of barbarians, the signs tell us that the warlords are not going to relinquish their totalitarian dreams. It is very unfortunate on their part that they are putting their hands in hornet nest where they may get stung with nuclear weapons. Their retaliation, for sure, will lead to total disaster. A disaster, far worse than what the title "World War 3" can convey.

### Ext Brazil = democracy promotion

#### Brazil = democracy promotion

**Barbosa, former Brazil ambassador to US, 2011**

(Ruben, National Interest, july CIAO accessed TM 7/8)

According to a National Intelligence Council¶ study, by 2025 Brazil will have achieved global¶ economic power status, with a GDP ranking¶ among the five largest in the world. Owing to¶ its vibrant democracy, diversified economy and¶ sound economic institutions, Brazil is a global¶ model as well as a regional one. Its ability to¶ grow economically while enforcing an ambitious¶ social agenda to reduce poverty and income inequality¶ will have a profound effect on economic¶ performance and governance throughout the¶ region for years to come.

### Ext Democracy impacts

#### Democracies increase international peace – interdependency reduces security dilemma

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

Political theorists usually explain states’ desire to promote democracy by variants¶ of the democratic peace theory,9 which finds its origin in Immanuel Kant’s¶ vision of a ‘federation of republics’.10 Kant argued that the division of power¶ would prevent leaders from launching wars without strongly reasoned arguments¶ framed in terms of collective interests. According to the democratic peace¶ proposition, established democracies not only have a normative claim to, but¶ also a genuine strategic interest in extending democracy around the globe.11 A¶ world of democracies will probably be more peaceful and better for trade and¶ investment (as the rule of law is usually weaker in authoritarian regimes),¶ providing the basis for international peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.¶ 12 By mitigating the security dilemma, democracies thus enable the¶ maximisation of economic welfare through far-reaching interdependence.13 In¶ addition, proponents of democracy promotion argue that it is ‘the right thing to¶ do’, spreading universally conceived values, and helping all human beings¶ obtain political rights and representation.14 The promotion and defence of¶ democratic values, ideas and concepts is thus one of the most powerful legacies¶ of liberal thought.

### Brazil Hegemony good: Regional Stability

#### 1. Brazil Hegemony helps foster regional stability

**Flemes and Wehner, 2012**

(Daniel and Leslie, “Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America”, GIGA, <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp207_flemes-wehner.pdf>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

The type of regional polarity (unipolarity) and the security order (security community) in which the relationships between Brazil and the region’s secondary powers are embedded have not changed significantly during the last decade. Moreover, historical drivers of contes‐ tation are not explanatory factors in this empirical setting given the peaceful past between Brazil and the South American secondary powers. Besides the historical rivalry between Bra‐ zil and Argentina, neither legacies of conflict nor mutual threat perceptions undermine the relationships of the states under consideration. Consequently, it is not likely that the major policy shifts on the part of the secondary powers towards Brazil in the last decade have been based on historical or structural drivers. Before analyzing the causes, and in particular the domestic drivers, of each secondary power’s strategic responses, we highlight Brazil’s for‐ eign policy behavior as a potential cause of contestation.Brazil’s willingness to provide public goods (distributional leadership) differs according to the issue area under consideration. Brasilia is not ready to pay the costs of economic inte‐ gration, but it is willing do what is necessary to secure regional stability. On the one hand, Brazil has recently been increasing its military spending in order to secure the status of the region’s dominant military power (Flemes 2008). On the other hand, Brasilia provides re‐ gional stability through its various mediation engagements and security‐cooperation initia‐ tives. Additionally, Brazil invests in the public goods of regional energy security and infra‐ structure (Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America, IIRSA). However, the country is not taking on a great share of the economic integration costs: the re‐ gional power does not support smaller UNASUR members through payments into structural funds. It is true that Brazil forgave the debts of Bolivia and Paraguay in recent years, but its smaller neighbors are demanding that Brazil open its consumer market to their goods.The acceptance of Brazil’s leadership in South America will depend on in addition to the provision of public goods its ability to bridge political and ideological cleavages by way of an ideational leadership project. In this regard, Brasilia is trying to guide the states of the region towards the shared goal of a South American space. Brazilian diplomacy has success fully established a regional consensus on democracy, human rights, development, the eco‐ social market economy and regionalized responses to the challenges of economic globalization (Burges 2008).

#### 2. Latin American instability causes extinction

**Manwaring ‘5** (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo.* More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

### Extensions –solve regional conflicts

#### Leadership in the region decreases conflicts

**Amorim,** Brazils Foreign Minister, **2011**

(Celso, “Reflections on Brazil’s Global Rise”, Quaterly America’s, January 31, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2420>, accessed on 7/9/13, BT)

More recently, the Brazilian government’s decision to recognize the Palestinian state triggered a series of similar acts by other Latin American countries. The gesture even contributed to some European countries reviewing their stance. Given Brazil’s new willingness to act on the international stage, it is natural that it would raise concern in some quarters. The official and unofficial statements by U.S. authorities have been mostly positive in nature, but the unease is palpable. It is possible that the Brazilian action undertaken with Turkey toward Iran has caused some discomfort in Washington DC. The agreement obliged the U.S. government to explain, not always convincingly, its reasons for refusing an agreement that met all of the points raised in President Obama’s letter to President Lula less than three weeks earlier. But Brazil’s increasing resourcefulness and independence will benefit the United States. On a number of occasions, Brazil’s stance has permitted a consensus that seemed impossible in the face of more radical positions. This was what happened at the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting in June 2009 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, when the decision was made to revoke Cuba’s suspension from the OAS. In other matters, such as Haiti or the conflicts involving Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, Brazil’s firm yet sensible position has been a steadying factor that has helped mitigate—if not fully eliminate—tensions and conflicts. Brazil’s influence in the region derives from its own economic and geographic weight, but is also influenced by its role in the international arena.

#### Brazil ensures regional stability – and displaces US role in disputes in region – plan forces tradeoff

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

Brazil has also been active in the security dimension, both regionally and at¶ the global level. At the global level the country has been particularly critical of¶ military interventions by the USA and its partners.46 Brazil defends a multilateral¶ approach to security issues, and furthermore wishes to reform the UN and¶ become a permanent member of the Security Council.47 Throughout the Lula¶ presidency, Brazil sought to situate itself as the key player in South America,¶ thereby marginalising the traditional central role of the USA. Arguably security¶ cooperation is one of the most significant aspects of Unasur**’**s cooperation and¶ of central importance to Brazil**’**s regional and hemispheric geopolitical strategies.¶ Brazil has played an important moderating role in several cases of internal¶ political instabilities, such as the case of Venezuela after the 2002 coup and that¶ of the domestic socio-political instability in Bolivia in 2003.48 Shortly after taking¶ over the presidency in 2003 the Lula government took the initiative to create¶ the Group of Friends of Venezuela, which aimed to stabilise the country¶ politically and protect its democracy.4

### Brazil Hegemony good - MERCOSUR

#### Brazil utilization of MERCOSUR demonstrates focus on regional alliances

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

Brazil’s pro-democracy stance became most obvious in 2012, when President¶ Dilma Rousseff—together with the leaders of Uruguay and Argentina—suspended¶ Paraguay from Mercosur after the impeachment of Paraguay’s President¶ Fernando Lugo, which most governments in the region regarded as the equivalent¶ of a coup d’état or a ‘parliamentary coup’.70 The Brazilian government thus¶ set a clear precedent that anti-democratic tendencies in the region would cause a¶ rapid and clear reaction from leaders in Brasília. President Rousseff’s decision¶ to work through Mercosur—rather than the OAS— is consistent with a growing¶ preference to use local regional bodies, possibly in an effort to strengthen projection¶ as a regional leader.

#### Mercosur regional integration solves free trade and economic growth in Latin America

**KW Admin 2012** (Kenya Writing Group Admin, International Studies Blog, Admin/Peer Reviewed, 9-5-12, International relations essay: MERCOSUR versus EU, http://kenyawriting.com/blog/blog/international-relations-essay-mercosur-versus-eu/)

Below is an analysis of the performance of MERCOSUR together with its strengths and weaknesses. Achievements of the union include: improved trade and cooperation among members, has expanded greatly since its inception and economic growth among member countries as there has been significant improvement in the GDP of member states. Limitations of the union are: lack of total cooperation among member states, conflicts that have highlighted weaknesses in MERCOSUR’s institutions. The MERCOSUR is expected to grow and evolve but this will be a gradual process and the union should not be compared to the EU or other established unions’ as it is still in its growing stages. The MERCOSUR is expected to evolve and adapt in the near future to a more stable and structured union (Luis 51). The North Atlantic Free trade Agreement of 1994 that was signed by North America, Canada and Mexico is a good example of where free trade has prospered. MERCOSUR members should also facilitate free trade between its member countries. Such an agreement would highlight issues on trade, environment and manufacturing. Free trade is an avenue through which the economy of the region can realize substantial growth.

#### Economic conflicts cause extinction

Daguzan 2010 (Citing Jean Francois, PhD and Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, "Economic crisis threatens existence of human beings" November 26, 2010, Right Vision News, pg online @ lexisnexis)

The financial and economic crisis being faced by the world is in fact a human catastrophe as it may threatenthe well-being and existence of human beings in the globe, said Dr. Jean-Francois Daguzan, senior research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, France.¶ ¶ He was speaking at a roundtable discussion on ‘The Strategic Consequences of World Financial and Economic Crisis’ organised by the South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) here on Wednesday. Former ambassador Tasawur Naqvi conducted the proceedings.¶ ¶ Dr. Jean-Francois Daguzan said that the crisis could lead to violence. Every effort should be made to control it as it may lead to risky and dangerous situations. He said that the balance of power had already changed.¶ ¶ He said that if economic crisis is compared with 9/11 and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the World Trade Centre debacle seemed to be a contingent affair. The financial crisis to him was like a nuclear war, which is tilting the balance of power in the world. He said that an amount of $50,000 billion went to the aid of developing nations. He noted the impact of the snowballing crisis on stock exchanges and investment potential of different countries. He said that the crisis also affected stability of nations by impacting equities and stock exchanges.¶ ¶ He said that the war in currencies is the last impact of the crisis in an age of artificial monetary powers of currencies, which would provoke and continue with economic crises within countries. He said that it is rebalancing the power politics in the world. He enumerated Southeast Asia’s economies facing problems in 1988 when China was big, but not enough to become the lone competitor of the west.

### Ext Mercusor impacts

#### Mercusor regional integration advances fight on poverty and exclusion

**PL News 2012** (Prensa Latina, Cuba Debate News, 12-7-12, MERCOSUR Consolidates Regional Integration Process, http://en.cubadebate.cu/news/2012/12/07/mercosur-consolidates-regional-integration-process/)

MERCOSUR is a forum of social, political, energy, productive, and agricultural integration from the Patagonia to the Caribbean, says the text. The heads of State also welcomed Bolivia’s decision to sign the protocol for joining the bloc, which will contribute to consolidate the process of union in Latin America. The leaders also reaffirmed the commitment to advancing towards comprehensive development of the peoples in fighting poverty and social exclusion and ratified the need to turn international cooperation into an instrument of regional integration. The summit was attended by Presidents Cristina Fernandez (Argentina), Jose Mujica (Uruguay) and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), as well as Venezuelan Minister of Energy and Mines Rafael Ramirez. Also attending were Presidents Evo Morales (Bolivia), Rafael Correa(Ecuador), Donald Ramotar (Guyana) and Desire Bouterse (Suriname), as well as Vice President of Peru Marisol Espinosa and Deputy Foreign Ministers Alfonso Silva (Chile) and Monica Lanceta (Colombia).

#### Poverty outweighs all other concerns

Maguire 1996 ("The Religious Consultation on Population, Reproductive Health & Ethics Population, Poverty and Sustainable Development”, http://www.sacredchoices.org/population\_poverty\_sustainable\_dev.htm,)

Poverty is genocidal and the malignant indifference and masked barbarity that underlie upper class virtue are complicit in the quiet slaughter of the poor. Poverty kills with an efficiency that could only be matched by all-out nuclear war. The wars that we have had are pikers in inflicting death compared to poverty. What war could kill 40,000 infants a day and do so with a silent efficiency that allows the polysaturated guilty to sleep comfortably in their beds, consciences fully anesthetized, with no rumble of distant guns to disturb their rest.

### Brazil regional hegemony good - regional integration

#### Brazil fosters regional integration

**Amorim, 2011**

(Celso, “Reflections on Brazil’s Global Rise”, Quaterly America’s, January 31, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2420>, accessed on 7/9/13, BT)

Our main goal is to transform South America into a true “Peace Zone”—a goal Brazil is gradually achieving. I emphasize these facts not only for the practical results they produced—reflected in trade and investment figures—but also because they are unprecedented. Rarely, if ever, during my approximately 45 years of diplomatic life (from which I should subtract seven during which I was busy performing other government functions) have I observed such dramatic change in such a short span of time. In the early days of the Lula administration, Brazil’s foreign policy was marked by an essentially defensive agenda in the FTAA and the WTO—a situation we reversed in only one year. At the same time, we also managed to place South American regional integration at the forefront of Brazilian diplomacy. We restored confidence in Mercosur and initiated the process that led to the creation of the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which includes the whole continent from Colombia to Argentina. The basis of UNASUR is a series of economic and trade agreements, but it also has a strong political component. That political role proved to be of central importance during recent crises, both internal (Bolivia, Ecuador) and between countries (Colombia-Venezuela). But our “diplomatic activism”—in the best sense of the word—was not restricted to South America. At the Sauipe Summit in Bahia, all the Latin American and Caribbean nations convened to discuss cooperation plans aiming at greater development and political understanding across the region.

### Economic integration = regional integration

#### Economic integration key to security and defense integration for region

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Brazilian officials thus envision integration as a multistep, multilevel process that will eventually en­compass political and security issues as well as eco­nomic and commercial affairs. “The first stage is com­mercial integration,” said one Defense Ministry official in 2004. “After that comes the macroeconomic one, and the military stage will be the roof of the edifice.”66 Brazilian officials portrayed the UN stabilization mis­sion in Haiti as an embryo for South American defense cooperation, and President Lula was the driving force behind the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS). The CDS is a still-nascent project that may eventually lead to more military-to-military con­tacts, more combined exercises, more collaboration on drug trafficking and other common threats, and less U.S. influence in South American defense affairs. “The geopolitical stance [the region] confronts,” Minister Jobim said in March 2008, “whether we admit it or not, is the set of old continental concepts emanating from the U.S.” Just as important, Brazil sees CDS as a first step toward creating a regional defense industry. Combined with Brazil’s growing technological capa­bilities, progress on this front will allow Brasilia to be­come a major supplier to South American militaries, with all the influence that entails.67

### Brazil regional hegemony good – peacekeeping

#### Brazil integral part of UN peacekeeping force

**Bodman and Wolfensohn, Chairs Independent Task Force CFR, 2011**

(Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director

“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Independent Task Force Report No. 66 CAIO accessed tm 7/9)

Brazilian peacekeepers, under the auspices of the UN, are stationed¶ across the world, especially in lusophone Africa and in Haiti, where¶ Brazil has led the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)¶ since 2004 and made among the earliest and largest financial contributions¶ there since the 2010 earthquake. Brazilian multinational corporations¶ operate and invest across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North and¶ South America. Brazil also plays a leading role within longstanding¶ and newly formed regional institutions (such as the Union of South¶ American Nations and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean¶ States), most of which eschew U.S. membership in order to foster¶ a South American or Latin American identity.

#### Peacekeeping solves global nuclear war

Dean 95 [Jonathan, former ambassador to NATO, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, p. google]

IN ANY EVENT, in a world of interconnecting COMMUNICATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL, TRADE, AND FINANCIAL LINKS, the United States, a leading industrial trading country that needs access to raw materials and markets, usually ends up paying in one way or another when a major regional conflict erupts. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, it is impossible for the United States to avoid some degree of involvement when major regional conflicts break out. FOR 200 YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN URGING LIBERTY, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE MARKET VALUES, VOLUNTARY MUTUAL AID AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE UNITED STATES IS THE SOLE SURVIVING WORLD-CLASS POWER, WITH MILITARY STRENGTH AND GNP FAR LARGER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AS A RESULT, when large-scale conflict erupts, the United States cannot avoid being called on for help, as it was in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti. For the United States to seek to stand aside or to respond only weakly in such cases is to risk damage to its credibility AND WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE. PRESIDENT CLINTON JUSTIFIED THE NATO BOMBING OF SERBIAN POSITIONS IN BOSNIA AND THE U.S. INVASION OF HAITI BY SAYING THAT THE CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. WAS AT STAKE, AS IT WAS. IT IS TRUE THAT PAST ADMINISTRATIONS USED SIMILAR ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM LONG AFTER IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WISE TO WITHDRAW. NONETHELESS, WHEN THE COLLECTIVE DISAPPOINTMENT OF WORLD OPINION OVER THE BEHAVIOR OF THE UNITED STATES (OR OF ANY MAJOR COUNTRY) BECOMES INTENSE AND ENDURING, IT BEGINS TO UNDERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND STANDING OF THE ENTIRE NATION CONSIDERABLE DIMINUTION OF U.S. STATURE AND INFLUENCE HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST FOUR OR FIVE YEARS IN CONNECTION WITH FALTERING U.S. POLICIES TOWARD BOSNIA, SOMALIA, AND RWANDA. FORTUNATELY, AMERICANS ARE NOT SPARTANS, ROMANS OR PRUSSIANS-SELF-DISCIPLINED MILITARISTIC PEOPLES WHO CONSIDERED IT A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIDE NOT TO RECOIL FROM CONFLICT BECAUSE OF CASUALTIES AMONG THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, IF THE TRENDS CONTINUE THAT UNDERLIE THE PUBLIC OUTRAGE THAT FOLLOWED THE DEATH OF U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SOMALIA, AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS CONTINUE TO ABSTAIN FROM PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THEY COULD ENTAIL CASUALTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT LONG REMAIN A WORLD POWER. If U.S. national prestige declines further under conditions like these, the U.S. capacity to constructively influence the course of events without the use of force will decrease. And when force must be used, the United States may have to use more of it to be effective. EXPERTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD EXPECT GROWING POPULATION PRESSURES AND INCREASING ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS TO DEVELOP OVER THE COMING DECADES INTO INTENSE, FAR-REACHING SOCIAL UNREST AND REGIONAL CONFLICT. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS THE SOLUTION, HOWEVER SLOW AND UNCERTAIN IT MAY BE IN COMING. BUT the world also needs effective regional conflict-prevention procedures. Left on its own, regional violence can lead to **confrontation** and even **war between the great powers**, including the United States, AS MIGHT OCCUR, FOR EXAMPLE, in the event of conflict between Ukraine and Russia or between China and its neighbors. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, unchecked regional violence and the fear of further violence will lead **more states to develop nuclear weapons**. IN PAST DECADES, this process occurred in Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, IRAQ, and PRESUMABLY, IN North Korea. A world with 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states would not only make a more effective global security system impossible, it would lead the present nuclear weapon states to modernize and increase their weapons-and it would markedly increase the vulnerability of the United States to direct attack. Instead of SHRUGGING AT HUMAN FALLIBILITY, accepting war as inevitable, AND REACTING AFTER IT HAPPENS, U.S. policy should aim at establishing an international peacekeeping system that can head off an increasing number of conflicts. CONSEQUENCES IF THIS REASONING IS ACCEPTED, THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DECIDE ON AND PUBLICLY DECLARE AN EXPLICIT LONG-TERM POLICY OF JOINING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN SEEKING A GRADUAL LOWERING OF THE LEVEL OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE WORLD THROUGH PREVENTING A GROWING PROPORTION OF POTENTIAL WARS AND CURTAILING WARS WHEN THEY DO OCCUR. This goal would be achieved by building an increasingly effective worldwide network of regional conflict-prevention and peacekeeping organizations headed by a more effective United Nations.

### Ext – Brazil = peacekeeping

#### Brazil participation in PKOs reflects growing regional power

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

¶ President Lula’s military policy is meant to serve multiple purposes, several of which have more to do with domestic politics than global ambitions. At the level of national strategy, however, this buildup is clearly linked to the drive for greater autonomy and influence. In planning documents and comments by high-ranking officials, the nation’s growing military capabilities are frequently characterized as a means of shaping events in Brazil’s neighborhood and a “de­fense shield” against meddling by hegemonic powers. Just as important, the buildup serves as a symbol of growing national power and a signal to both regional and global observers that Brazil intends to pursue a serious geostrategic role. In 2008, the Chief of Staff of Brazil’s Navy told an interviewer, “Those who have nuclear submarines sit on the United Nations Security Council. All permanent members have the technology, which none of them give up. We have to develop our own.”34 In this same spirit, Brazil has participated in numerous UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990s, and President Lula’s government eagerly took the lead in commanding the UN stabilization mission de­ployed to Haiti in 2004. As Minister Jobim explained in 2008, “What we want is to have voice and vote in the international arena, and this only goes to countries that have a defense structure to deter and to express national power.”35

### Brazil regional hegemony good –environment

#### Brazil huge investments in renewable as well as oil

**Bodman and Wolfensohn, Chairs Independent Task Force CFR, 2011**

(Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairs; Julia E. Sweig, Project Director

“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Independent Task Force Report No. 66 CAIO accessed tm 7/9)

Massive deposits of oil, discovered in 2006 off the coast of Rio de¶ Janeiro, should place Brazil among the world’s top ten energy producers¶ in this decade. Brazil exported approximately fifty-seven thousand¶ barrels per day of cane-based ethanol in 2009, rivaling—and, by some¶ estimates, surpassing—the United States as an exporter.5 Renewable¶ resources supply almost 50 percent of Brazil’s relatively clean energy¶ matrix, with sugarcane-based products alone accounting for 19 percent¶ of its total supply. Hydroelectricity also plays an important role in providing¶ roughly 75 percent of Brazil’s electricity. Water is both a source¶ of renewable energy for Brazil and, given looming global water shortages,¶ an important asset (especially as used to support agriculture).¶ Brazil is home to 18 percent of the world’s available fresh water, much¶ of it derived from the Amazon River basin. The Amazon rainforest is¶ itself a valuable resource, recycling carbon dioxide to produce more¶ than 20 percent of the world’s oxygen.

### Brazil key to Venezuela containment

#### Brazil position vis a vis neighbors limits Venezuela’s rise

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

The imperative of asserting Brazilian leadership has become all the more important in view of the contested geopolitical environment in South America. Recent U.S. policy toward Latin America has arguably been one of benign neglect, but Washington has nonetheless signed free trade agreements and strengthened relations with key countries like Chile, Colombia, and Peru. More pressing still is the issue of Venezuela, which under President Hugo Chávez has staked its own claim to regional leadership. Through projects like PetroCaribe and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, formerly the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas), extensive aid to populist politicians in other countries, and the acquisition of advanced weapons systems from Russia and other suppliers, President Chávez has shown that he intends to make Venezuela the dominant power in South America. In public, Brazilian officials insist that they do not view President Chávez as a threat, but in private, they seem to recognize that his bid for regional leadership places Brazil in a difficult position. Openly confronting President Chávez would polarize the ideological and diplomatic climate in South America, destroying any chance for a more unified—and thus more influential—region. Yet taking too passive a stance risks allowing President Chávez to accumulate influence and isolate Brazil.60

### Brazil hegemony checks US power

#### Brazil limits US market share in Latin America

**Teixeira 11** (Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, professor of International Relations, “Brazil and the institutionalization of South America: from hemispheric estrangement to cooperative hegemony”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 6/23/2011, accessed 7/10/2013, GU)

Because of the prospects of altering the status quo in the South American subsystem, this scenario was feared by Brazil, which held suspicions regarding the establishment of free trade in the Americas since the beginning and saw it as an “obstacle to the designs of Brazilian leadership within the regional order” in South America (Cervo and Bueno 2008, 488). In fact, the Brazilian Foreign Minister during the Cardoso administration described the FTAA as a tool to consolidate US “economic preponderance in the continent” and as a “potential threat” to Brazil, therefore mirroring verbatim the Clinton administration’s view of Mercosur (Lampreia 2010, 183, 189). When the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was unveiled in 1991, Brazil was clearly “the least enthusiastic among the participating countries to move forward on hemispheric integration” (Rompay 2004, 120). In fact, Brazilian official position towards hemispheric free trade has been, like the US official position, considerably consistent through time, permeating four different administrations from different political outlooks. Basically, Brazil’s strategy has been one of securing and reinforcing its position within the South American subsystem in order to avoid its absorption by an all encompassing hemispheric subsystem. Within this context, the establishment of Mercosur with the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 was a key strategic component. As soon as George Bush announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Collor de Mello administration in Brazil responded that it would only negotiate a hemispheric agreement within the 4+1 framework, i.e. the four countries of the recently created Mercosur would take a joint position when negotiating with the United States. In 1993, the same year that NAFTA was approved by the US Congress, the Itamar Franco administration made a proposal for a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). These early efforts demonstrate the Brazilian concern in securing a “continental base” for itself in order to counter the prospects of a US commercial offensive in South America. In fact, when Cardoso was the Brazilian Foreign Minister, he spoke about the notion of a “South American platform” (Cardoso 1994, 185) and later, as president, Cardoso referred to Mercosur as “a pole from which we will organize the South American space” (Cardoso 1998, 127). Mercosur was thus seen as a hub from which Brazil would build an alternative pole of attraction in the hemisphere, and as a result would attempt to create obstacles for greater US penetration in the South American subsystem. As will be shown below, these efforts were continued and then deepened in subsequent Brazilian administrations.

### Internal link –Brazil military checks US power

#### Brazil only challenger to US – could challenge militarily in Atlantic

**Kozloff**, author of Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left, **2012**

(Nikolas, “Is Obama wary of Brazil and Dilma Rousseff”, May 5, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/2012428134850333757.html>, accessed on 7/10/13, BT)

In his book The Next Decade, Stratfor founder George Friedman writes that Brazil is not currently a power that is "particularly threatening or important to the United States", and "there is minimal economic friction". In the long term, however, Friedman believes that "there is only one Latin American country with the potential to emerge as a competitor to the United States in its own right, and that is Brazil".      Eventually, adds Friedman, Brazil could pose an economic challenge if it developed its air and naval power so as to dominate the Atlantic between its coast and West Africa, "a region not heavily patrolled by the United States". This could lead to "a South Atlantic not only dominated by Brazil but with Brazilian naval forces based on both the Brazilian and the African coasts".Given such alarmism, it is not surprising that, behind the scenes, Stratfor developed a **keen interest** in Brazilian military developments. In one secret email, the company remarked to researchers that "Brazil will be building up its military capacity over the next decade or so. ANYTHING to do with Brazil's military doctrinal development and military industrial development is of interest. This is a top priority, long-term item". Publicly, the US and Brazil enjoy formal armed forces ties, but behind the scenes there has been friction over the question of military technology. According to WikiLeaks cables, top officials in the Brazilian military are unhappy about US export licenses. The officers griped that the state department's policy of delaying such licenses was "aimed at restricting Brazil's access to military technology", and had created "problems at the political level".According to Sobel: "Many of Brazil's political leaders remain uncomfortable with the idea of a close security relationship with the US and believe France would be a better strategic partner." During a recent trip to France and Russia, the Brazilian defence minister negotiated greater arms ties and was accompanied by a whole host of top level officials, including the presidential foreign policy adviser, the secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs and the long-term planning minister.The Stratfor corporation was apparently very interested in Brazil's efforts to establish military ties with outside powers, and in an email, company officials remarked: "Specifically, watch for relationships with more advanced military powers to be established (eg France) where technology transfers may be formalised." In Rio de Janeiro, **some Stratfor sources** believed that France had actually bribed Brazilian officials to purchase "inferior" Rafaele jet fighters. There were some "serious kickbacks going on", the source claimed, and unfortunately the US Treasury Department "forbids us to pad their wallets the way the French can".

### Brazil Hegemony good- US interests

#### Respect for Brazil regional hegemon status fosters global partnerships -

**Barbosa, former Brazil ambassador to US, 2011**

(Ruben, National Interest, july CIAO accessed TM 7/8)

The U.S. government views Brazil as a force¶ for moderation and stability in a region that is¶ host to the newly formed Bolivarian Alliance¶ (ALBA), an organization that is critical of the¶ United States. Thus granting special status to¶ Brazil among Latin American nations would¶ serve Washington’s interests. It might also, in¶ the medium term, engender a new, more realistic¶ and nuanced view of Brazil, one that is less¶ informed by stereotypes. Such a view would¶ acknowledge Brazil’s separateness from the rest¶ of Latin America and open the way toward a¶ new global partnership.

## Answer to Answer blocks

### AT US presence in Latin America inevitable

#### Even if your claims are true, Brazil believes the US is in relative decline – the plan only thing to alter that perception

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

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Brazilian strategic analysis thus features a pervasive sense of danger—a fear that the strictures of the current global order might impede Brazil’s develop ment or otherwise limit its potential. But it is also characterized by a sense of opportunity. Brazilian officials acknowledge that the United States remains the dominant player in the international system, but they view it as unlikely that Washington can maintain this position indefinitely. As early as the 1990s, a high-ranking official in the Defense Ministry commented on “the visible imbalance between its military hegemony and its worrying economic situation, with its huge domestic and external debt and the technological and administrative competition from other world powers.”22 Since then, other officials have openly opined that the United States is in relative decline. As American power ebbs, the global system will gradually approach a point of greater geopolitical flexibility, an opening that rising nations like Brazil can exploit to attain greater influence and freedom of maneuver. “If we know how to work in the 21st century,” said President Lula early in his presidency, “this will be the century of the so-called emerging countries, like India, Brazil, South Africa, China, Mexico, and Russia, hitherto considered second-class nations.”23

### AT Brazil lacks hard power for regional hegemony

#### Brazil increasing its acquisition of hard power through purchases and joint agreements

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

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Brazil is not simply purchasing equipment; it is also negotiating agreements that will allow it to develop its military-industrial base and eventually eliminate any dependence on foreign suppliers. “We are not engag­ing in a shopping festival,” says Minister Jobim, “but in a festival of national technical improvement based on the transfer of technology.” Brazilian representa­tives have emphasized joint partnerships between Brazilian firms and their foreign counterparts and told European suppliers that they are only interested in purchases that involve no-strings-attached technolo­gy transfers. Given the eagerness of European suppli­ers to satisfy Brazil’s appetite for advanced weaponry, it has not been difficult to negotiate a range of joint projects that will result in the construction of fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, and, perhaps most notably, the aforementioned nuclear submarine.31

### AT China checks Brazil power

#### No, geographic difference and similar agenda

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

President Lula’s reliance on the G-4 as the vehicle for his Security Council ambitions indicates a second aspect of Brazil’s middle-power strategy. This aspect involves building coalitions that offset the diplomatic and economic asymmetries of a unipolar system and serve as force-multipliers for Brazilian influence. President Lula has cultivated “strategic partnerships” with a wide range of countries, including developed middle-powers like Russia and France, as a means to this end. Yet the foremost emphasis of his coalition-building strategy has been on expanding cooperation with other “Southern,” or developing countries.47 According to President Lula and his top advisers—namely Minister Amorim, Marco Aurélio Garcia, and Guimarães—the strategic interests of Brazil and other major developing countries are fundamentally convergent. Because Brazil is geographically removed from countries like China and India, it need not fear them as rivals; because these nations share Brazil’s interest in replacing unipolarity with a more flexible international order, they might well be its natural diplomatic partners. “Despite the differences between Brazil and other large peripheral states,” Guimarães argued in 1999, “inasmuch as they share common characteristics and interests and are far away from one another, they do not have direct competitive interests and are therefore able to construct common political projects.”48 If Brazil can give impetus to these projects, it can increase its geopolitical leverage and position itself as the voice of the Third World in its dealings with the West.

### AT Lula no longer president /all your cards are about Lula

#### Lula established unique position for Brazil – no evidence that Roussef will break with his grand strategy

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Finally, President Lula’s diplomacy has created a web of relationships that his successors may be able to exploit. At the regional level, the creation of UNASUR and CSD and the expansion of Mercosul have, at the very least, provided the institutional basis for future integration under Brazilian auspices. At the global level, the IBSA and BRIC forums provide settings for the potential consolidation and expansion of South-South ties, and President Lula’s various strategic partnerships offer avenues for strengthening relations with other middle powers and emerging nations. If nothing else, President Lula will leave the presidents that come after him with a wide array of possibilities and significant diplomatic flexibility.

### AT Brazil will never break with the US –

#### Mistrust of US motives and efforts to constrain Brazil means Brazil military fears US intervention

Barham, Senior Strategy Officer at IFC - International Finance Corporation, 2011, John, “COOPERATION OR COLLISION: THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL, AND EMERGING GLOBAL POWERS”, Georgetown University, April 1st 2011, Proquest, 7/10/13, JG

Additionally, Brazil and the US could begin clashing more frequently over¶ foreign affairs and global governance as Brazil develops a more active foreign policy. It does not help that Brazil‘s political elite, the military, and the higher reaches of the¶ bureaucracy remain suspicious of, if not hostile to, the West in general and the US in¶ particular.23 Their hostility is based on the belief that the international system constructed¶ over the years by the West is being used to perpetuate their power and interests over¶ those of the developing world.24 This antagonism is perhaps becoming even more¶ pronounced now as Brazil gains confidence as a regional leader, with its fast-growing¶ economy, and the discovery of ―supergiant‖ offshore oilfields with reserves estimated at¶ 50 billion barrels.25 Senior Brazilian officials openly state the country may become a¶ target of future American indirect or military intervention, just as the Middle East has¶ become, as the US seeks to control secure sources of oil. Envisioning such a possibility,¶ the Brazilian navy intends to build a nuclear submarine fleet to patrol its oilfields.26 The¶ defense minister has warned the US against notions of ―shared sovereignty‖ in the South¶ Atlantic and stated, reflecting Brazil‘s claim to regional leadership, that, ―South¶ Americans will not be partners of the United States so that it can maintain its role in the¶ world.‖27 These concerns can be seen as a continuation of longstanding Brazilian¶ suspicions that the US covets Brazilian territory and aims to limit its sovereignty in key¶ areas, notably the Amazon.28 However unfounded or bizarre these beliefs may appear in¶ Washington, they are nonetheless deeply held among senior officials in Brazil‘s national¶ security establishment. In fact, these views have informed Brazilian opposition to aspects¶ of US regional policy, such as military support for Colombia‘s anti-guerrilla operations, which some Brazilian officials believe is merely a form of covert US intervention in the

Amazon.

## Aff Answers

### Aff answers – alt causes hurt regional hegemony

#### Multiple challenges to Brazil leadership – including current US economic engagement in region

**Christensen, Aalborg University , 2013**

Steen Fryba “Brazil’s Foreign Policy Priorities”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 271-286, taylor and francis, accessed tm 7/15

¶ The above discussions show a number of Brazilian successes in its South¶ American regional strategy. However, relations with the South America countries¶ have not been without problems. Argentina has strongly opposed Brazil**’**s¶ bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council,62 and Brazil has faced a¶ number of economic tensions and conflicts in its relations with neighbouring¶ countries. Bolivia**’**s nationalisations in the energy sector, which affected the partially¶ state-owned Brazilian energy giant Petrobrás, is perhaps the most noteworthy¶ example.63 The Brazilian government accepted the nationalisations and Lula¶ noted Bolivia**’**s sovereign right to its own natural resources, focusing on¶ negotiating adequate compensation while avoiding a diplomatic escalation with¶ Bolivia.64 However, domestically, the government**’**s soft diplomatic strategy¶ towards Bolivia and other South American governments, particularly Argentina,¶ and its positive relations with the Venezuelan and Cuban governments, have¶ been criticised by the opposition and independent critical analysts as not being¶ in Brazil**’**s interests but representing an ideological preference for relations with¶ ideologically similar governments on the political left.65 Brazil faces several¶ other challenges to its leadership in the region, for example the bilateral free¶ trade agreements between the USA and Colombia, Peru and Chile, and the creation¶ of a group called the Pacific Alliance by these latter three countries and¶ Mexico in June 2012. Some analysts argue that Brazil**’**s South America strategy¶ has failed because of its hegemonic approach to the region and its aims of¶ becoming a central player in the global political system.66 Other analysts argue¶ that Brazil**’**s prioritisation of South America has been unsuccessful because of¶ the difficulties encountered in the region and because there is a growing sentiment¶ among Brazilian elites that the country should not let itself become¶ restricted by the region in its foreign policies.67

#### Brazil can’t compete internationally – for decades

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Purely by dint of its size and economic capacity, Brazil will exert a strong pull on regional and global politics in the coming decades. Even under the most optimistic projections, however, Brazil will not pos­sess the economic or military capacity to compete with other major powers—namely the United States, China, and the European Union (EU)—for decades, if then. If Brazil is to achieve what political scientists call “systemic impact”—the ability to shape the global order in meaningful ways—it will have to do so not through the inexorable accumulation of geopolitical weight, but through the resourcefulness of its strat­egy and diplomacy. Accordingly, this monograph ex­amines Brazilian grand strategy as it has developed under President Lula with an eye to illuminating its characteristics, prospects, and implications for the in­ternational system in general and the United States in particular. The present is a propitious time for such an undertaking; with President Lula set to leave of­fice at the end of 2010, Brazilian grand strategy may be approaching an inflection point, making a proper understanding of the strategy pursued over the last 8 years all the more important for Brazilian and U.S. observers alike.3

#### Alt causes harm Brazil position - lack of support for UN Security Council seat

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

¶ Yet, for all of his domestic and foreign policy accomplishments, Lula, who was succeeded by his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, fell short in one key goal: securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazilian army soldiers acting as U.N. peacekeepers in front of the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Brazil has been seeking inclusion for years, but, unlike India, has yet to receive explicit U.S. support. President Obama's visit to Brazil in mid-April once again raised, and then dashed, those hopes. Inclusion, more than anything, say analysts, is the fulcrum of Brazil's global status. Brazil's handling of the recent UN vote on the Libya no-fly zone is an excellent example, say analysts. In keeping with its general opposition to military intervention, Brazil abstained."Leadership comes with obligations," says Farnsworth. "I think it [voting yes] would have been a positive signal." Brazil's move was reminiscent of its abstention in the case of sanctions against Iran several years ago. Washington and Brazilia also differed on the Honduran coup of 2009.

#### Alt cause – cocaine trafficking, Chavez and Iran

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

Analysts also say Brazil has also not done enough in tackling cocaine trafficking. Though the country is not a producer, Bolivian cocaine is transported through its territory. (Brazil is second only to the U.S. in consumption of of the drug.)¶ "If they're going to stand up and be a leader they'll have to take some responsibility in these areas," says Noriega, who was Ambassador to the Organization of American States. "What is their role with drug trafficking, Chavez and Iran?"

#### Brazil obstacles undermine grand strategy to challenge US and establish regional power base

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

This grand strategy has clearly benefited Brazil in the short term, raising the country’s international profile and creating an array of strategic, commercial, and diplomatic options that President Lula’s succes­sors may pursue.4 Yet Brazilian grand strategy also entails four key dilemmas that President Lula has not been able to resolve, which could obstruct or at the very least complicate the country’s geopolitical ascent. First, issues like poor infrastructure, rampant crime, and excessive taxation and regulation of the economy may impede Brazil from attaining the strong econom­ic growth and social cohesion necessary to sustain such an audacious strategic project. Second, in dealing with South America, the Brazilian political class has not reconciled its desire for regional leadership with its unwillingness to share power or economic benefits with its neighbors. As a result, many of these coun­tries perceive Brazil’s diplomacy to be domineering and its trade policies to be narrowly self-interested, and they have thus refused to support President Lu­la’s bid for regional preeminence. Third, at the global level, the long-term usefulness of President Lula’s various “strategic partnerships” and alliances is open to question. The IBSA and BRIC forums are much less cohesive—and thus less diplomatically effective—than they appear at first glance, and pursuing close relationships with countries like Iran may ultimately hurt Brazil’s democratic image and create more prob­lems than opportunities. Fourth, while President Lula has maintained good relations with Washington, his grand strategy unavoidably entails a growing risk of conflict over issues like Iran, trade policy, and the U.S. diplomatic and military role in Latin America. If not managed carefully, these frictions could eventually push U.S.-Brazil relations in a tenser, less productive direction, impairing the interests of both countries. Looking ahead, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strat­egy—and its consequences for U.S. interests—will be contingent on how President Lula’s successors ad­dress these dilemmas.

#### Structural economic issues preclude Brazil rise

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Brazil’s slower-than-desired growth is often attributed to high interest rates, which have remained elevated as a guard against inflation. The problem, however, runs much deeper than this. The Brazilian economy has traditionally been constrained by a maze of regulation and red tape, and even with recent reforms, there remain immense barriers to the sort of entrepreneurial activity that produces sustained growth. On nearly every major marker of entrepreneurial competitiveness—tax rates, time spent paying taxes, time spent dealing with government officials, the number of days and permits required to start a business, time required to clear direct imports and exports through customs, and many others—the Brazilian economy rates considerably worse than the Latin American average. Payroll taxes reach a stifling 60 percent, discouraging expansion and pushing many small and medium enterprises into the informal sector, where they are locked out of formal capital markets and do not contribute to the government’s fiscal base.73 The advantage of high tax rates is that they have allowed

Brazil to mobilize a comparatively large chunk of GDP for government use; the downside is that these high costs and cumbersome regulations have restricted in­novation and allowed the perpetuation of a bloated, inefficient bureaucracy. Additionally, Brazil’s long-term potential for growth is limited by the fact that educational reforms have not kept pace with other social programs, and so while more children are at­tending school, they are not necessarily acquiring the knowledge or skills that will allow them to become more productive than their parents.74

#### Infrastructure gaps require investment that limits economic competitiveness – means Brazil not on the rise in the SQ you don’t have uniqueness

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

August 2010 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1017.pdf

Infrastructural deficiencies pose an additional challenge. Brazil’s ability to export efficiently, as well as to develop its large internal market, is hindered by the immense difficulty of transporting goods across the country’s rough terrain. The rail system is under­developed, and as of 2004, only some 10 percent of the country’s 1.74 million kilometers of roads were paved (and more than half of that 10 percent were one-lane roads). The ports are outdated and over-saturated, despite the modernization program launched under President Cardoso, meaning that stocks often sit on the docks for 3 weeks or more before being shipped. All this deters export-oriented firms from expanding and thereby creating new jobs and greater prosper­ity.75¶ Economists generally agree that addressing these problems will require sizable investments in educa­tion and infrastructure and, more importantly, ma­jor structural reforms designed to spur innovation, decrease regulation, and lessen the burdens of doing business. Unfortunately, the current characteristics of the political system conspire against such measures. The electoral system over-represents small parties with parochial interests, making it all the more diffi­ cult to forge the broad coalitions necessary to support sweeping structural changes. Corruption remains rampant, as illustrated by two massive payoff scandals during President Lula’s first term, and powerful interests such as government bureaucracies and state-owned companies like Petrobras have a vested interest in preserving the status quo.76 All this has weakened the impetus for structural reform, and according to one leading survey, Brazil is actually getting worse in terms of economic competitiveness. Brazil fell from 127th to 129th in “ease of doing business” from 2009 to 2010, and it suffered similar declines with respect to “ease of paying taxes” and “ease of starting a business.”77 The macroeconomic consequences of this weakness have so far been mitigated by large government stimulus packages, but Brazil’s declining competitiveness and failure to implement the required reforms speak ill of its long-term economic prospects.¶ If Brazil cannot achieve and sustain higher levels of growth, it could eventually face several barriers to its geopolitical designs. Low growth rates would mean fewer resources for military modernization, development projects, and diplomatic initiatives abroad. They could also sap the national confidence that President Lula has tapped into, causing Brazilian politicians to argue that the country should concentrate on getting its own affairs in order. This may already be happening, in fact; José Serra, the presidential candidate put forward by the centrist Brazilian Social Democratic Party—PSDB—has argued for a more restrained foreign policy and greater attention to economic and political problems at home. Finally, because robust economic growth will be necessary to bring about additional reductions in poverty, a Brazil that lags in these categories could face resurgent class and social cleavages that might limit its internal cohesion—and thus its geopolitical potential.78 Oil money may ease some of these potential dislocations, but given price volatility, relying primarily on an expected petroleum windfall is a gamble, not a strategy.

#### No rise – gangs

**Brands** Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Duke University and former de­fense analyst  **2010**

(Hal “DILEMMAS OF BRAZILIAN GRAND STRATEGY“ Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

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The economy is not the only internal issue that could retard Brazil’s ascent. The country also faces a stern test of its domestic security capabilities in the form of the large, well-armed gangs that dominate huge stretches of major cities like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. These gangs generally have ties to the drug trade and a variety of illicit economic networks, and in many *favelas* they are so powerful that police, re­porters, and other unwelcome visitors enter only at the risk of death. The potentially devastating impact of this insecurity came into sharp relief in May 2006, when hundreds of attacks by one such gang, the First Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo, resulted in dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in damages, and threw South America’s largest city into chaos. “The sad reality,” remarked one observer “is that the state is now the prisoner of the PCC.”79

### Aff answers – democracy promotion

#### Democracy promotion used as tool of US hegemony

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

¶ From a realist point of view, on the other hand, international norms are¶ mainly seen as instruments for great powers to project their influence and¶ advance their interests. Realists may agree that promoting democracy can be¶ well intentioned, but argue that countries only promote democracy if this is¶ aligned with other interests in the strategic or economic realm. They point out¶ that the USA promotes democracy because democracies are more likely to trade¶ with it and integrate into the US-led global system, thus becoming less likely to¶ cause instability. Whenever democracy promotion collides with economic or¶ geopolitical interests, it will become a secondary issue.15 Democracy promotion¶ has thus been a US tool to legitimise its hegemony. As Pratap Mehta argues:¶ Nations typically appeal to some form of philanthropy for external legitimation.¶ The delicate trick in any imperial intervention is to make this¶ philanthropy—be it saving the world, making it safe for democracy, or safeguarding¶ socialism—coincide with the best and most enlightened expression¶ of the national interest. An expansionary power needs an ideology that can connect its national interest to its philanthropic aims. And its philanthropic¶ aims must represent an idea of international order that other nations can¶ accept.16¶ According to this logic, democracies—no matter whether long or recently established—¶ will promote democracy themselves if doing so is aligned with their¶ overall strategic and economic interests, and if they are willing to adopt democracy¶ promotion as means to legitimise their growing influence.

#### Link - Democracy promotion key tool of colonialism

**Stuenkel** School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo,

Brazil **- 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

Many critics of democracy promotion also use Marxist arguments and¶ describe democracy promotion as a continuation of colonialism.21 From this¶ perspective Western democracy promotion can be understood as a new form of¶ transnational control accompanying the rise of global capitalism. William¶ Robinson describes it as ‘an effort to replace coercive means of social control¶ with consensual ones in the South within a highly stratified international system,¶ in which the US plays a leadership role on behalf of an emergent transnational¶ hegemonic configuration and a “transnational elite”’.22 In the general debate¶ critics describe democracy promotion as incoherent, insincere and only thinly¶ veiling economic interests. With frequency they point to the West’s reluctance¶ to elevate the objective of democracy promotion above all other interests at all¶ times. For example, critics ask why the Bush administration did so little to promote¶ democracy in autocratic Saudi Arabia, while targeting Venezuela with¶ democracy assistance, even though its president was elected democratically.23¶ Who decides which country needs to democratise and which dictatorship is¶ allowed to persist? One often used argument is that, seen from a historical perspective,¶ rather than acting as a force of democratisation, the principal political¶ form that the USA has promoted is that of authoritarian regimes.24 This double¶ standards argument, of course, is not confined to Marxist thought alone.

#### Brazil doesn’t increase democracy promotion

**Stuenkel - 2013**

Oliver “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy

Promotion: the case of Brazil and India”, Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 339-355

Taylor and Francis accessed tm 7/15

Yet there are also critical voices. Summarising Brazilian foreign policy over¶ the past two decades, Sean Burges argues that **‘**Brazil has not behaved consistently¶ in support of democratic norm enforcement**’**,71 and that decisive action to¶ preserve democracy has been **‘**tepid**’**.72 Ted Piccone reasons that **‘**when it comes¶ to wielding**…**influence in support of democracy in other countries**…**Brazil has¶ been ambivalent and often unpredictable**’**.73 Both these evaluations were made¶ before Brazil**’**s assertive stance in Paraguay in 2012. Nevertheless, despite this¶ strategy, the term **‘**democracy promotion**’** is not used either by Brazilian policy¶ makers or by academics when referring to Brazil**’**s Paraguay policy. In the same¶ way Brazil does not promote any activities comparable to those of large US or¶ European nongovernmental organisations, whose activities range from political¶ party development, electoral monitoring, supporting independent media and¶ journalists, capacity building for state institutions, and training for judges, civic¶ group leaders and legislators.

### Miscellaneous

#### Brazil cooperation with China bad – US interests

**Bozzo, 2011**

(Albert, “China had the Olympic Games, South Africa had the World Cup” CNBC April 25 <http://www.cnbc.com/id/42683728> accessed tm 7/15 )

Another complicated issue is Brazil's relationship with China, which President Russeff recently visited.

Beijing and Brazilia are cooperating in space exploration. What's more, although the two compete in many markets, China's hunger for commodities has pushed it past the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trade partner. (Some 12.5 percent of Brazil's exports go to China, vs. 10.5 percent for the U.S., according to the CIA World Factbook.)

Brazil is a major producer of soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugar cane, citrus and beef. It also boasts bauxite, gold, iron ore, platinum, rare earth elements, uranium, timber and petroleum among its ample natural resources.

Farnsworth sees a "strong vision of cooperation with China that is not necessarily in the U.S. interests."